TR - Temple v. Temple (1/13/2005)

[Riser Adkisson LLP]

Catherine D. Temple v. Robert M. Temple, et al.
Nos. 83758 & 83797 (Ohio App. 01/13/2005)

COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO, EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT, CUYAHOGA COUNTY

2005 Ohio 92

January 13, 2005, Date of Announcement of Decision

PRIOR HISTORY: [*1] CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Civil appeals from Common Pleas Court.
Domestic Relations Division. Case No. DR-275812.

DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED.

COUNSEL: For Plaintiff-Appellee: JILL FRIEDMAN HELFMAN, Taft, Stettinius & Hollister, LLP,
Cleveland, Ohio.

For Defendant-Appellant, Robert M. Temple: JOSEPH A. PFUNDSTEIN, Malek Pfundstein & Dean,
Beachwood, Ohio.

JIMMY C. CHISUM, Defendant-Appellant, Pro se, New River, Arizona.

For Guardian Ad Litem: ELIZABETH A. STEIN, Beachwood, Ohio.

JUDGES: ANTHONY O. CALABRESE, JR., JUDGE. PATRICIA ANN BLACKMON, P.J., and
DIANE KARPINSKI, J., CONCUR.

OPINIONBY: ANTHONY O. CALABRESE, JR.

OPINION: JOURNAL ENTRY and OPINION

ANTHONY O. CALABRESE, JR., J.:

In this consolidated appeal, defendants-appellants Robert M. Temple ("Temple") n1 and Jimmy C.
Chisum ("Chisum"), n2 pro se, appeal various decisions of the Cuyahoga County Court of Common
Pleas, Domestic Relations Division. For the reasons stated below, we affirm.

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n1 Cuyahoga App. No. 83758.

n2 Cuyahoga App. No. 83797.

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[*2] The facts adduced from the record are as follows: On or about March 16, 1981, plaintiff-
appellee Catherine Temple ("Catherine") and Temple were married. n3 Temple denied the existence of
a marriage, but the court found by clear and convincing evidence that the two were married. The
court found that the parties resided in the same home, furnished their home together, had sexual
relations, and presented themselves as husband and wife in the community. One child was born as
issue of the marriage, Robert Temple III, born March 27, 1989 ("Robby").

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n3 Although the parties testified that they held a religious ceremony, they never obtained a
marriage license. Catherine claimed in her complaint that a common-law marriage existed between
the couple.

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The couple owned five parcels of real estate in Bristolville and Farmington Township, Ohio. Their
primary residence was on Stroup Hickox Road, Bristolville. The court found the fair market value
of the properties to be $ 552,000. While on the property, the couple [*3] ran a veterinary clinic.
Temple was also engaged in the business of veterinary services and the selling of exotic livestock
such as llamas and birds.

Sometime in 1985, various trust agreements were allegedly entered into. n4 Chisum acted as the
"trustee" of the trusts. Temple placed all of his possessions into the trusts, including his home
and other buildings located on the properties; all furniture and furnishings; income from all
sources; bank accounts; gold and silver coins; paintings; a collection of llamas and exotic birds;
cars; tractors; guns; clothes; and jewelry. Upon receiving the certificates of indeterminable
value from the trustee, he immediately transferred the certificates into another alleged trust,
thus apparently leaving him with nothing. As the alleged trusts were also irrevocable, Temple
maintains that he is without assets to be distributed. Chisum and Temple claim that Chisum was
required to authorize any withdrawals from the trust accounts. n5

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n4 The trusts were entitled "Black Creek Management," "Nassau Life Insurance Co. Limited,"
"Hanlish Foley LLC," "Trundle Management," "Galingale Group," and "Old Laborador Investment Co."
[*4]

n5 There is no evidence that Temple's requests for withdrawals were ever questioned or rejected by
Chisum. Chisum resides in Arizona. By his own account, Chisum does not report his income to the
Internal Revenue Service, have a social security number, or own a driver's license. Like Temple,
he claims his property belongs to one or more trusts.

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The parties presented differing positions as to the extent of their involvement in creating and
managing the trusts. Catherine argued that she had no true involvement in the trusts. Temple
argued that at times Catherine held fiduciary positions with the trusts. In 2001, the United
States Tax Court found Temple's trusts to be fraudulent attempts to conceal his assets. Robert M.
Temple v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue (Nov. 1, 2000), T.C. Memo 2000-337, Docket No. 23071-
96.

In March 2000, Temple was arrested for domestic violence upon Catherine. Following the incident,
Catherine and Robby moved out of the couple's residence, and Catherine filed a motion for
temporary restraining order in the Trumbull County Court [*5] of Common Pleas. Thereafter, the
couple reached an agreed order whereby visitation was scheduled for Temple while maintaining
Catherine's interests in restraining Temple's contact with her. Catherine later moved to Lakewood.

On September 1, 2000, Catherine filed a complaint for divorce as well as a temporary restraining
order ("TRO") against Temple. Catherine filed an additional TRO against Frank Bodor ("Bodor"), an
attorney for Temple. n6 On January 21, 2001, after considerable motion practice, the court issued
a judgment entry for support that established Temple's child support obligation to Catherine as
well as his rights to visitation with Robby.

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n6 Bodor was later dismissed from the lawsuit.

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On or about May 17, 2001, and upon Temple's motion, the court appointed Elizabeth Stein ("Stein")
guardian ad litem, and the matter was referred to Family Conciliation Services for an
investigation and report. On June 27, 2001, Catherine filed a motion to disqualify Bodor from
representing Temple [*6] because of previous representation he gave to both Temple and Catherine.
On August 1, 2001, after conducting a hearing, the court granted Catherine's motion to disqualify
Bodor.

On October 23, 2001, Catherine filed a motion for immediate inspection of real estate. On October
29, 2001, Temple and Chisum were held in contempt of court, without hearing, for failing to
produce copies of the trust documents. Temple and Chisum appealed, and this court reversed the
orders of the trial court in order for the court to conduct a hearing. n7 On April 23, 2002, Stein
filed an ex parte motion to suspend Temple's visitation with Robby. On April 24, 2002, the motion
was granted. On April 29, 2002, Temple filed a motion to vacate. n8

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n7 Cuyahoga App. Nos. 80455 and 80456, 2002 Ohio 5835.

n8 The trial court never ruled on the motion.

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On March 31, 2003, the divorce proceeding finally began. Following numerous continuances and
recesses, the case concluded on June 30, 2003, and the parties [*7] filed written closing
arguments, findings of fact, and conclusions of law. On October 10, 2003, the trial court issued a
47-page opinion awarding a divorce to Catherine, addressing property division, and allocating
parental rights and responsibilities.

On November 10, 2003, Temple timely appealed and this matter was consolidated with case number
83797. n9 Temple advances eight assignments of error for our review. Chisum advances ten
assignments of error for our review. We elect to address Temple's assignments of error first. n10

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n9 Temple v. Temple, et al. (2004), Cuyahoga App. No. 83797.

n10 Our discussion of Chisum's assignments of error begins in section IX of this opinion, page 22.

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I.

In his first assignment of error, Temple argues that "the trial court erred in granting [him] far
less than the standard visitation with the parties['] minor child." We disagree.

Initially, Temple argues that the trial court erred by failing to conduct a hearing on Stein's
[*8] motion to suspend visitation. At the time, the court concluded that "visitation with father
be suspended immediately, until such time as appropriate arrangements for visitation with father
are presented and approved by the Court." Temple argues that as a result of the court's decision,
and subsequent refusal to rule upon Temple's motion to vacate, his relationship with his son has
become "nonexistent."

Although the court arguably should have conducted a hearing prior to granting the guardian ad
litem's motion, the error became harmless following the divorce trial and journal entry awarding
limited visitation to Temple. The question for this court, and the specific issue to which Temple
appeals, is whether the trial court's granting of this limited visitation was proper. Following
the divorce proceedings, submission of arguments, findings of fact and conclusions of law, the
court found that Temple is to receive visitation with Robby two days per month, from Saturday at
10:00 a.m. until Sunday at 7:00 p.m. It is from this decree that Temple advances his primary
arguments.

R.C. 3109.051(F)(2) sets forth the visitation guidelines. This [*9] section also permits the trial
court to deviate from these guidelines based on factors provided in R.C. 3109.051(D). Having
reviewed the record, we find that the court properly considered R.C. 3109.051(D) in deviating from
the standard visitation guidelines. We review the trial court's decision under an abuse of
discretion standard. n11 Pisani v. Pisani (Jan. 27, 2000), Cuyahoga App. No. 76980.

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n11 Abuse of discretion connotes more than an error of law or judgment; it implies that the
court's attitude is unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable. Stuffleben v. Cowden, Cuyahoga
App. No. 82537, 2003 Ohio 6334.

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The court considered the respective relationships Robby had with each parent, finding he has a
healthy relationship with Catherine, while his relationship with Temple is "strained." The record
indicates that Temple was often angry and would yell at Robby and kick the family dogs. Robby
would ask Catherine not to [*10] tell Temple about school events. Further, Catherine testified
that Robby would have nightmares after returning from visits with Temple, his fingernails would be
chewed down, and he would pick wounds on his extremities until they were raw. These episodes would
eventually subside, only to return upon Robby's next visit with Temple.

The court also found that Temple created a risk to Robby's safety and welfare. In 2002, Robby
reported to his mother and Stein that Temple had fallen asleep at the wheel of his car and drifted
into an adjoining lane, forcing another car off of the road. n12 Robby had to yell at his father
to wake him up.

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n12 Temple claimed this episode was caused by a heart condition, but no evidence was submitted to
substantiate the claim.

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The court also considered the distance between Temple and Robby. Temple lived approximately 70
miles away from his son. The court found it unreasonable for Robby to have to make this trip
during the week. The court reasoned that such [*11] a trip is unreasonable considering the amount
of extracurricular activities Robby is involved in at school.

We find the trial court did not abuse its discretion by deviating from the standard visitation
guidelines. n13 Temple's first assignment of error is overruled.

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n13 An additional fact we find persuasive is that Catherine requested that she be designated
residential parent and legal custodian of Robby. Temple made no such request.

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II.

In his second assignment of error, Temple argues that "the trial court abused it[s] discretion in
imputing income to [him] despite the fact that he did not change his income or source of
employment for the last ten years." We disagree.

The calculation of child support is governed by R.C. 3113.215. A trial court may impute income to
an individual if it determines that the person is voluntarily unemployed or voluntarily
underemployed. R.C. 3113.215(A)(5). Once the trial court [*12] elects to impute income, it must
consider the factors set forth in R.C. 3119.01(C)(11). These factors include, but are not limited
to: the parent's prior employment; education; special skills and training; age and special needs
of the child; the parent's increased earning capacity because of experience; and any other
relevant factors. Absent an abuse of discretion, the trial court's determination will not be
overturned.

Temple argues that the court erred by finding he was underemployed and by failing to consider the
lack of prevailing job opportunities and salary levels in the community in which he lives. He
argues that he has not changed his position in the last ten years, and that both he and Catherine
testified that they never made much money maintaining the couple's properties.

Catherine argues that the court considered the requisite factors and properly found Temple to be
underemployed. Specifically, the court found Temple's health does not prevent him from working
full time and that Temple has worked as a veterinarian and curator of mammals at the Columbus Zoo;
veterinarian for Sea World in Florida; performed contract service [*13] for Sea World in Ohio; and
practiced privately in Ohio. Also, the court noted that his Ohio veterinary license is currently
in good standing. When presented with various publications listing full-time veterinarian
positions in the area, Temple maintained that he had no interest in working at such places. He has
not filed a tax return since 1987, even though he admits having more than $ 50,000 in a bank
account from March 2000 to the present. Also, the court found the "trusts" to which Temple
associates all of his prior assets to be a sham in order to avoid taxation. n14 From the
foregoing, the court found that Temple could earn $ 72,800 as a full-time veterinarian. From this,
the court ordered Temple to pay $ 780.32 per month, plus 2-percent processing charge, as and for
child support. n15

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n14 This will be discussed at greater length in section III of this opinion.

n15 Temple never produced discovery in regard to his income.

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Having reviewed the record, we find that the court did not [*14] abuse its discretion. Appellant's
second assignment of error is overruled.

III.

In his third assignment of error, Temple argues that "the trial court erred by calling the trusts
created by the parties a 'sham' simply due to a tax court ruling." We find Temple's argument is
without merit.

Regarding the trusts, Temple claims he transferred all of his worldly possessions into them and
that Chisum, n16 who served as trustee of the alleged trusts while residing in Arizona, had
control of the trust assets, all of which remained in Ohio. Temple and Chisum stated that all of
Temple's income was deposited into the trusts' bank accounts located in Arizona and that Chisum
was required to authorize any withdrawals from those accounts. n17 However, testimony indicated
that Temple and Catherine each had a signature stamp in his or her possession which gave each the
authorization to withdraw funds. Temple argues that such authorization by the stamp could only be
used with Chisum's written permission.

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n16 Our discussion of Chisum takes place later in this opinion.

n17 As stated earlier in this opinion, there is no indication that Chisum ever rejected, or even
questioned, Temple's request for a withdrawal of funds. Further, Temple maintained possession and
control over all of the alleged trust properties and chattels.

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In finding that the trusts were a sham, the trial court relied upon the United States Tax Court
decision which found Temple's trusts to be fraudulent attempts to conceal his assets and that he,
in fact, maintained control over the assets said to be held in trust. Temple argues that the trial
court's reliance on the tax court ruling was inappropriate because the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals held, while upholding the tax court's ruling, that the tax court decision did not affect
the validity of the trusts. n18 The Sixth Circuit held that "*** under established tax law, the
income which Temple had attempted to assign to the trusts *** was, nevertheless, for income tax
purposes attributable to him." Id. at P2. Temple concludes that the trial court was obligated to
perform an independent examination of the validity, as well as the interests of the parties in the
trusts. We agree and find that the court did conduct such an examination.

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n18 Temple v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue (Apr. 4, 2003), 65 Fed.Appx. 605.

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Temple is correct that the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the tax court judgment "***
does not in any way affect the legal rights and obligations of the trusts or the relationship
between Temple and the trusts." Id. However, the court continued, finding that "the evidence in
the record, notably not including the trust documents, is inconclusive as to the legal existence
of the trusts." The absence of any evidence continues in the case sub judice.

The burden of proving the existence of a trust rests on the person asserting it. Gammarino v.
Hamilton Cty. Bd. of Revision (1998), 84 Ohio St.3d 155. Temple failed to produce either the
underlying trust documents or other indicia of their existence. Although the trial court may have
been incorrect in finding that "the alleged trusts are a sham as a matter of law" based on the tax
court decision alone, the court conducted its own examination of Temple's claims and discerned
that the trusts do not exist. The court questioned Temple, initially asking whether Temple
received anything in return for placing his assets in these trusts. Although Temple did receive
certificates, he relinquished [*17] them into another trust. The court continued:

"Court: What would possess you to do that?

"Temple: For asset protection.

"Court: Well, you don't have any assets to protect; you gave them away?

"Temple: Well, they are protected as far as the IRS was concerned.

"Court: They are protected from you.

"Temple: If that's what the trustee decided to do.

"Court: 'Rather than pay my ex-brother-in-law 20,000, I am going to give away a 500,000 farm?'"
n19

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n19 Besides the avoidance of paying federal taxes, another reason given by Temple for the trusts
was to prevent his former brother-in-law from collecting a $ 20,000 judgment against him.

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The court further found that no evidence was provided as to whom the beneficiaries are under the
trusts; the couple was able to withdraw money from the trusts; and Temple maintained physical
possession of all tangible property associated with the [*18] trust.

We find that the court did not err in finding that independent of the tax court's ruling, the
assets purported to be in trust were, in fact, readily accessible assets in the possession and
control of Temple and, therefore, were not protected by the alleged trusts.

Temple's third assignment of error is overruled.

IV.

In his fourth assignment of error, Temple argues that "the trial court erred by ignoring the
trusts created by the parties when determining the 'marital' nature of the property." We disagree.

Contrary to Temple's argument that the trial court invalidated for purposes of ownership the
trusts that were created in 1985, we find that the trial court simply determined that Temple
failed to establish that the assets contained in the alleged trusts were not marital property.
Without proof of the establishment of the trusts, the court was correct to find the property
marital.

Temple's fourth assignment of error is overruled.

V.

In his fifth assignment of error, Temple argues that "the trial court erred in determining that
none of the property testified and presented to the court was premarital [*19] and was the sole
property of [Temple] and should not have been divided." We disagree once again.

In any divorce action, the starting point for a trial court's analysis is an equal division of
marital assets. R.C. 3105.171(C); Neville v. Neville, 99 Ohio St.3d 275, 2003 Ohio 3624. However,
R.C. 3105.171(C) clearly provides that where an equal division would be inequitable, a trial court
may not divide the marital property equally but instead must divide it in the manner that the
court determines to be equitable. Id. In order to determine what is equitable, a trial court must
consider the factors set forth in R.C. 3105.171(F). Id.

"Appellate courts generally review the overall appropriateness of the trial court's property
division in divorce proceedings under an abuse of discretion standard. *** Furthermore, a trial
court's property division should be viewed as a whole in determining whether it has achieved an
equitable and fair division. The trier of fact, as opposed to the appellate court, is in a far
better position to weigh the credibility of witnesses." [*20] Hess v. Riedel-Hess, 153 Ohio App.3d
337, 2003 Ohio 3912.

Under certain circumstances, separate property may be converted to marital property when it is
commingled with marital property. Cimperman v. Cimperman, Cuyahoga App. No. 80807, 2003 Ohio 869.
The commingling of separate and marital property, however, does not destroy the character of the
separate property unless its identity as separate property is not traceable. R.C.
3105.171(A)(6)(b). The party seeking to have a particular asset classified as separate property
has the burden of proof, by a preponderance of the evidence, to trace the asset to separate
property. Cimperman, supra. "While the starting place for an equitable property division is an
equal assignment of marital debt, after considering all the relevant factors in a case, a trial
court may choose to award one party more of the marital debts and still have an equitable order."
Id.

R.C. 3105.171(F) provides:

"In making a division of marital property and in determining whether to make and the amount of any
distributive award [*21] under this section, the court shall consider all of the following
factors:

"(1) The duration of the marriage;

"(2) The assets and liabilities of the spouses;

"(3) The desirability of awarding the family home, or the right to reside in the family home for
reasonable periods of time, to the spouse with custody of the children of the marriage;

"(4) The liquidity of the property to be distributed;

"(5) The economic desirability of retaining intact an asset or an interest in an asset;

"(6) The tax consequences of the property division upon the respective awards to be made to each
spouse;

"(7) The costs of sale, if it is necessary that an asset be sold to effectuate an equitable
distribution of property;

"( Any division or disbursement of property made in a separation agreement that was voluntarily
entered into by the spouses;

"(9) Any other factor that the court expressly finds to be relevant and equitable."

Temple argues the evidence at trial established that certain property was premarital, to wit,
[*22] four parcels of land that were purchased prior to the marriage and certain paintings that
were in his possession prior to the marriage. Catherine argues that this property became marital
property based on actions during the marriage. We agree with Catherine.

While Temple may have owned the parcels of land prior to the marriage, both he and Catherine
worked to maintain the condition of the properties and created a business thereon. Likewise, while
the paintings may have been brought into the marriage by Temple, there is nothing to suggest these
paintings were kept separate from the home or otherwise maintained an independent existence from
the rest of the couple's property. The court considered the factors listed in R.C. 3105.171, and
we find nothing in the record to suggest the court abused its discretion in dividing the property.

Temple's fifth assignment of error is overruled.

VI.

In his sixth assignment of error, Temple argues that "the trial court abused its discretion and
ignored the evidence in this matter in determining that [he] acted alone in the creation and
management of the various trusts." This assignment [*23] of error is without merit.

Whether or not Temple acted alone in the creation of the trusts bears no impact on the
distribution of the property allegedly contained in them. Assuming arguendo we agree with Temple
that Catherine was involved, Temple has failed to request any relief from such a finding.

Temple's sixth assignment of error is overruled.

VII.

In his seventh assignment of error, Temple argues that the "finding of contempt against [him] was
improper as he had stated on numerous occasions that he did not have any of the records
requested." We disagree.

A person charged with contempt for violation of a court order may defend by proving it was not in
his power to obey the order. Pugh v. Pugh (1984), 15 Ohio St.3d 136, 140. The party seeking to
establish the defense of impossibility bears the burden of satisfying the court that his failure
to obey was due to an inability to render obedience. Offenberg v. Offenberg, Cuyahoga App. Nos.
78885, 78886, 79425, and 79426, 2003 Ohio 269. A judge's ruling of contempt will not be disturbed
on appeal absent an abuse of discretion. Id.

In [*24] the case sub judice, Catherine propounded a request for production of documents upon
Temple. This request went unanswered. Catherine then filed a motion to compel which was granted,
but the documents were still not produced. Temple argues that the documents requested were not in
his possession and, therefore, he was unable to comply with the discovery request. Temple
maintained the position that he was not entitled to any information regarding the trust, as he
held no ownership therein. In order to facilitate review of the alleged trust document, the court
issued an order appointing an independent person to review the trust documents and determine the
value of the assets owned by the trust. Temple was ordered to pay up to $ 3,000 and Chisum was
ordered to advance these funds to him. Neither party complied with this order nor did they contest
the order itself.

We find the trial court did not abuse its discretion in holding Temple in contempt. Temple may not
attempt to avoid the distribution of assets by hiding behind alleged trusts and then pretend the
alleged documents are not under his control.

Temple's seventh assignment of error is overruled.

VIII.

[*25] In his eighth and final assignment of error, Temple argues that "the trial court erred in
ordering [him] to pay Catherine Temple's legal bills." We disagree.

It is within the sound discretion of the trial court to award attorney's fees in a divorce action.
Schafer v. Schafer, Lucas App. No. L-00-1255, 2002 Ohio 129. A decision to award attorney's fees
will be reversed only upon a showing of an abuse of discretion. Id. R.C. 3105.18(H) provides, in
material part: "In divorce or legal separation proceedings, the court may award reasonable
attorney's fees to either party at any stage of the proceedings, including, but not limited to,
any appeal *** if it determines that the other party has the ability to pay the attorney's fees
that the court awards. When the court determines whether to award reasonable attorney's fees to
any party pursuant to this division, it shall determine whether either party will be prevented
from fully litigating his rights and adequately protecting his interests if it does not award
reasonable attorney's fees."

In the case sub judice, the court considered the extraordinary issues in this case, [*26]
including searching to establish the alleged trusts and ownership of assets and incomes. Further,
there were collateral proceedings in federal and state courts. n20 Also, the court found that
"absent an award of attorney fees, [Catherine] would be prevented from fully litigating her rights
and adequately protecting her interests." Regarding Temple's ability to pay, the court found that
Temple's 400 acres of real estate was valued at more than $ 500,000 and that he has sold items
allegedly contained in the trusts to finance cross-country trips. Therefore, his claims of
insolvency are baseless.

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n20 These include the tax case against Temple and the affidavits of prejudice filed by Temple and
Chisum with the United States District Court.

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The trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding attorney fees to Catherine. Temple's
eighth assignment of error is overruled.

IX.

Defendant-appellant James C. Chisum ("Chisum"), pro se, argues that the trial court erred by
improperly holding him [*27] in contempt and sentencing him to a 30-day jail sentence. We find no
error.

Chisum argues that he "simply did not disobey any order" and contends that every document subject
to the discovery requests was submitted. Chief among Chisum's allegations is that the trial court
repeatedly:

"*** [excluded] all evidence from defendant/appellant *** [accepted] uncertain hearsay and
statements by appellee council [sic] as evidence from appellee, [practiced] law from the bench in
aid to the plaintiff, [extorted] breech [sic] of contract obligations through menace and the
threat of more jail time, *** and [aided] the plaintiff through fifth amendment instruction while
demanding answers of appellant ***."

Chisum found these "errors" to be an "abuse of discretion, simple error, compounded error and
judicial misconduct, perhaps even judicial tyranny."

Chisum further argues the trial court "adopted the whims [sic] desires [sic] and thoughts of
appellee council [sic] above sworn testimony at every turn." Moreover, Chisum argues the trial
court "*** summarily without evidence or jurisdiction repeatedly extorted, coerced and [*28]
cojoled [sic] appellant into violations or breeches [sic] of ethics and obligations of contracts"
and acted "*** apparently with forethought and planning for malice." n21 Such meritless drama and
empty characterizations will not be tolerated by this court.

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n21 This is a mere sampling of Chisum's allegations.

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Chisum shall note that in Ohio pro se litigants are bound by the same rules and procedures as
those litigants who retain counsel. They are not to be accorded greater rights and must accept the
results of their own mistakes and errors. Tisdale v. Javitch, Block & Rathbone, Cuyahoga App. No.
83119, 2003 Ohio 6883. "Although the judicial system affords great leeway to pro se litigants in
presenting their arguments to the court, those same pro se litigants are to conduct themselves
with the same sense of decorum and common courtesy expected of licensed attorneys." State v.
Richard, Cuyahoga App. No. 82247, 2003 Ohio 5921.

In this case, Chisum [*29] was aware the alleged trust documents were requested by counsel and the
court, but failed to present them without delay or excuse. Chisum should have been aware that
failure to comply with court orders may result in a finding of contempt. In fact, at one point
Chisum acknowledged his understanding of contempt. The court asked Chisum two questions: "Do you
understand that failing to abide by that order will put you in direct contempt ***?" and "Do you
understand that if this court determines that you are in direct contempt, I can sentence you to
jail until you comply with my order; do you understand that?" Chisum twice replied, "Yes." We find
no error in the court's order of contempt or sentence. n22

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n22 The court's order provided that the contempt order would be purged if Temple and Chisum
performed 200 hours of community service.

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Chisum is hereby placed on notice that the undocumented allegations he has spewed upon this court
through his appellate brief will not, under any circumstances, be [*30] tolerated in the future.
Chisum's brief is mean spirited, unprofessional, childish, and rude. There is no place for such
filings, pro se or not, in this or any other court of law. n23

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n23 Chisum has also filed 42 U.S.C. 1983 claims against the trial court in the United States
District Court of the Northern District of Ohio. See Chisum v. Celebrezze (Aug. 29, 2002), N.D.
Ohio Case No. 1:02 CV 1292 (Matia, J.)(case summarily dismissed). Chisum filed suit again in 2003.
See Temple v. Celebrezze (June 2, 2003), N.D. Ohio Case No. 4:03 CV 689 (Economus, J.)(case
summarily dismissed).

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Chisum's first assignment of error is overruled.

X.

Chisum's second assignment of error, simply entitled "'Sham Trust' treatment of Appellant
'Obligations of Contract,'" is also overruled. n24 As stated above, the court conducted its own
examination of Temple's claims and discerned that the trusts do not exist. In addition to the
reasons set forth in section III of this opinion, [*31] the court inquired about the trusts with
Chisum. The court asked: "And you don't know the beneficiary of the trust that you are the trustee
of, and you don't know who those beneficiaries are; is that your testimony?" Chisum replied: "I
have no firsthand knowledge, and it would be improper for me to testify on hearsay." One question
later, Chisum testified that the beneficiary named on the trust in question was a foreign trust.

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n24 See also sections III and IV of this opinion.

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Following a mentally exhaustive dialogue with Chisum, the court established that a copy of the
trust was located in the cabin where Chisum was staying. The court took a recess and ordered
Chisum to "*** go back out to your log cabin and *** bring that document back to this courthouse
***. Now, at that point we will have an in camera inspection of that, and I will make sure that
the only thing that is divulged is who the foreign trustee is. *** Do you understand the
instruction that I have given." Chisum responded, "Yes. [*32] " Upon returning to the court,
Chisum failed to produce the alleged trust, instead claiming the order given by the court was
inapplicable to the documents that he allegedly had in his possession. Chisum's strained logic is
not worthy of recitation.

The trial court is not required to produce the discovery which one party seeks to rely. The burden
of production is on the parties. In this case, the court took the unusual step of allowing Chisum
one last opportunity to present the documents he failed to produce for three years. For Chisum to
now argue the court failed to conduct an in camera inspection is pure folly. The blame rests with
Chisum and Temple, not the court.

Chisum's second assignment of error is overruled.

XI.

Chisum's third, fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh, and ninth assignments of error are overruled as
they lack any substance in law or fact.

XII.

Chisum's eighth assignment of error is overruled. n25

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n25 See section V of this opinion.

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Judgment [*33] affirmed.

It is ordered that appellee recovers of appellants her costs herein taxed.

The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the Cuyahoga County Court
of Common Pleas, Domestic Relations Division, to carry this judgment into execution.

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of
Appellate Procedure.

ANTHONY O. CALABRESE, JR.

JUDGE

PATRICIA ANN BLACKMON, P.J., and DIANE KARPINSKI, J., CONCUR.

N.B. This entry is an announcement of the court's decision. See App.R. 22(B), 22(D) and 26(A);
Loc.App.R. 22. This decision will be journalized and will become the judgment and order of the
court pursuant to App.R. 22(E) unless a motion for reconsideration with supporting brief, per
App.R. 26(A), is filed within ten (10) days of the announcement of the court's decision. The time
period for review by the Supreme Court of Ohio shall begin to run upon the journalization of this
[*34] court's announcement of decision by the clerk per App.R. 22(E). See, also, S.Ct.Prac.R. II,
Section 2(A)(1).

Related -- Robert M. Temple v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue (U.S. Tax Court 11/01/2000)