|
Some
offshore trust proponents likely will declare Merry's use of
her foreign asset protection trust to be a success, since
the $3.5 million in trust assets have not been touched by
the Florida court or by her ex-husband. Most of the rest of
us will see this case for what it is – another in a long and
consistent line of courtroom failures of offshore trusts to
protect assets while allowing the settlors of those trusts
both their beneficial use of the trust assets and their
corporeal freedom in the U.S.
There
has yet to be a reported court case where a foreign asset
protection trust has worked as a practical matter. Not only
have these trusts routinely failed in the courtroom, but
courts and legal academics have branded the use of foreign
asset protection trusts as a gutter tactic. Remarkably, they
continue to be standard planning fare for many planners.
This
case is particularly egregious, since not only did Merry's
use of the Cook Islands trust force her into hiding to avoid
jail, but it also cost her the ability make what may well
have been a successful appeal on the issue of whether her
action to enforce and interpret the post-nuptial agreement
was a challenge that caused her to forfeit the $1.5 million
payment from her ex-husband.
Furthermore, as a fugitive, Merry has not seen her children
for several years, and had to turn herself in just for some
brief time with them on Saturday mornings. Merry has lost
her right to appeal, she has lost custody of her children,
and she can't even go out for a cheeseburger like any other
Joe Blow.
In other
words, not only did Merry's Cook Islands trust fail to serve
its purposes, but it actually put her in a much worse
position than if she had done nothing at all.
If Merry
tries to get the money from the trust, but can’t, how long
might she be held in jail in contempt of court? Stephen Jay
Lawrence was recently released by the U.S. District Court
for the Southern District of Florida after over six years of
imprisonment for contempt of court for failing to repatriate
assets from an offshore asset protection trust.
In re Stephen J.
Lawrence, 279 F.3d 1294 (11th Cir.
2002).
I want
to see the disclosure letters given to clients that warns
them that they might spend some years in jail if they do not
agree to repatriate their trust assets. Who would be crazy
enough to go forward with planning with such a letter? Yet,
without such a letter, clients are arguably being defrauded
into entering into a transaction lacking adequate disclosure
of the actual risks based upon existing case law.
Will it
be worth saving the $3.5 million to spend an undeterminable
amount of time in jail seeing her children for a few hours a
month – assuming they visit?
Using
offshore asset protection trusts to protect the bulk of a
person’s assets must end. In the 2005 bankruptcy law
changes, Congress sent a strong message that insolvent
debtors would not be allowed to stash assets in self-settled
spendthrift trusts. The courts have shown little inclination
to recognize such trusts, and the entry of repatriation
orders against those with such trusts is now routine.
The case
law involving offshore trusts is getting worse, not better.
The much-talked about but never seen "good case" that
validates the benefits of the foreign asset protection trust
has simply not materialized.
That
asset protection trusts continue to be commonly used, or
that planners want them to work, does not overcome the fact
that when challenged in U.S. courts they have routinely and
nearly consistently failed. It is time to put down the Cook
Islands Kool-Aid and move on.
Continuing Concealment
Doctrine and
Retained Interests
Wilferd v. Wardle,
2007 WL 391583 (D.Utah, Feb. 1, 2007)
Wardle bought two
businesses from the Wilferds, giving them a promissory note
for $1.2 million. Wardle later defaulted on the note and the
Wilferds sued him. While this case was pending, Wardle sold
his residence for $10 to his wife by quit claim deed
claiming "asset protection" reasons for the transfer.
More than a year
later, Wardle filed for bankruptcy but omitted that he had
owned the residence which he had transferred to his wife.
The bankruptcy court denied Wardle's discharge, applying
what is known as the Continuing Concealment Doctrine.
A bankruptcy
court is required to discharge the debts of a debtor under
section 727(a)(2) unless the debtor has engaged in certain
misconduct, such as fraudulently transferring or concealing
property within one year before the filing of the bankruptcy
petition.
Wardle claimed
that because he transferred his residence to his wife more
than one year before he filed for bankruptcy, that section
727(a)(2) would not apply.
The court
rejected Wardle's argument by application of the Continuing
Concealment Doctrine, which allows the application of
section 727 to deny a discharge so long as property
continues to be concealed within the one year period.
Wardle claimed
that the Continuing Concealment Doctrine should not apply to
his case because he lacked any intention to hinder, delay or
defraud creditors.
The court
rejected this argument on the grounds that the Continuing
Concealment Doctrine can be satisfied by a transfer or title
coupled with retention of the benefits of ownership.
Importantly, the court also noted that there was evidence of
Wardle's purpose to defeat anticipated creditors as found in
Wardle's own deposition:
Q. You had
indicated that you assigned your title in the home to [your
wife.]
A. Yes.
Q. What
consideration did you get for that?
A. What do you
mean by consideration?
Q. Did you get
any money from her?
A. A $10
transaction.
Q. All right. And
so why did you do that?
A. Just asset
protection.
Q. You wanted to
protect the home from the Wilferds?
A. From the
Wilferds, from anybody.
Wardle's
contention that he had no actual intent to defraud creditors
was belied by a number of factors, most importantly that
"retention of the use of the transferred property very
strongly indicates a fraudulent motive underlying the
transfer."
Our analysis:
Bankruptcy is an
arena to be avoided for those who have attempted to engage
in asset protection planning. The primary purpose is not to
protect the debtor, but instead is to marshal the debtor's
assets for the benefit of creditors. The bankruptcy laws
create many traps for debtors and many avenues for creditors
to circumvent debtors' schemes.
This is another
case where the admission by the debtor that he engaged in
asset protection planning tended to indicate an actual
intent by the debtor to engage in planning meant to hinder,
delay or defraud creditors. One cannot testify that "asset
protection" was a substantial reason for planning, and
expect that the planning will survive a fraudulent transfer
analysis.
Because of the
Continuing Concealment Doctrine, a debtor may be denied a
discharge for attempting to hide his interest in a personal
residence even if the residence was transferred some time
before the debtor files for bankruptcy, if there was any
evidence (including an admission that the debtor engaged in
asset protection planning) that the debtor meant the
transfer to remove assets from the reach of creditors.
Although Wardle
claimed that he had sold his residence to his wife, in fact
he continued to benefit from the residence. Absent evidence
of a transaction for reasonably equivalent value, which a
gift or transfer for nominal consideration will never
satisfy, the transfer of a residence in which one continues
to live may be ineffective for asset protection purposes.
For estate
planners, this point is particularly relevant in the case of
a transfer to a Qualified Personal Resident Trust (QPRT) in
which the transferor retains the right to live in the
residence for a period of years.
During the fraudulent transfer limitations period,
the residence will be subject to claims of creditors of the
transferor. This
period lasts for four years from the date of the transfer in
most states.
In California,
for example, the four-year limitations period in some
circumstances does not begin to run until
a creditor has obtained a judgment.
Therefore, the transfer of a California residence to
a QPRT may be subject to a fraudulent transfer claim for
seven years from the date of the transfer, the period of
unique “extinguishment” statute of limitation under the
California UFTA. That's an awfully long period of time to
wait to see if a transfer might survive a fraudulent
transfer challenge.
Even after the
limitations period expires, although the residence might not
be available to the creditors of the transferor, the
transferor's retained interest in the QPRT will be available
to her creditors.
If a creditor were able to force the sale of the
residence within the QPRT, the creditor would be able to
attach the income stream of the grantor retained annuity
trust (GRAT) to which the QPRT would convert for the
remainder of the QPRT term. There are other potential flaws
with a QPRT as an asset protection tool, but you get the
picture.
Asset protection
is not a game, and those who attempt to game the system will
find that judges may use obscure rules such as the
Continuing Concealment Doctrine to get around a ploy by the
debtor that might otherwise technically avoid being a
fraudulent transfer. Admitting that a transfer was done for
asset protection reasons sends up a bright red flag and, as
here, makes the judge both suspicious and willing to thwart
the debtor's intent.
Retaining
interests is particularly dangerous in asset protection
planning, since retained interests can by themselves support
a finding that an arrangement was a fraudulent transfer. It
is skating on thin ice to keep strings over an asset or
maintaining the beneficial use of an asset that was
purportedly transferred away. That you might be able to do
it for tax purposes will be of absolutely no relevance at
all when creditors come a'calling.
Saying that a
debtor did something for asset protection reasons can be, in
some circumstances, tantamount to an admission of the
debtor's intention to engage in a fraudulent transfer. Since
there is never a need to make such an admission, just don't
put your clients in a position where they might have to do
that.
Single-Member LLCs
and Charging Orders
In
re Ashley Albright,
No. 01-11367 (Bkrptc.D.Col. 04/04/2003) was the first
opinion to consider the case of the so-called single-member
LLC. There, the sole member had filed for personal
bankruptcy, and the court held that charging order
protection would not prevent the Trustee from marshalling
the assets of the entity to satisfy creditors, explaining:
“A
charging order protects the autonomy of the original
members, and their ability to manage their own enterprise.
In a single-member entity, there are no non-debtor members
to protect. The charging order limitation serves no purpose
in a single member limited liability company, because there
are no other parties' interests affected. * * * Because the
Trustee became the sole member of Western Blue Sky LLC upon
the Debtor's bankruptcy filing, the Trustee now controls,
directly or indirectly, all governance of that entity,
including decisions regarding liquidation of the entity's
assets.”
Two recent cases
have further considered single-member LLCs in the
creditor-debtor context.
In one case, a single-member LLC was once against deemed to
be part of the debtor’s bankruptcy estate without regard to
charging order protection. In another case, a single-member
LLC was deemed to be the alter ego of its parent. Neither
case bodes well for the use of single-member LLCs for asset
protection planning.
Case #1: In re A-Z
Electronics, LLC, 350 B.R. 886 (Bkpr.D.Id 2006)
Husband
and Wife jointly filed for Chapter 7 claiming a 100%
ownership in A-Z Electronics LLC.
Two
years later, A-Z Electronics LLC itself filed a voluntary
Chapter 11 petition seeking reorganization. Husband and Wife
signed the Chapter 11 petition on behalf of A-Z Electronics
LLC, and Husband signed the list as one of the 20 largest
unsecured creditors. The statement of financial affairs for
A-Z Electronics LLC said that it was 100% owned by Husband.
The
bankruptcy Trustee moved to dismiss A-Z Electronics LLC’s
Chapter 11 case.
Since
under Idaho law a membership interest in an LLC is personal
property, it becomes property of the bankruptcy estate when
the member’s bankruptcy petition is filed.
The
court quoted the Albright opinion for the proposition that
where “there are no other members in the LLC, . . . the
Debtor’s bankruptcy filing effectively assigned her entire
membership interest in the LLC to the bankruptcy estate, and
the Trustee obtained all her rights, including the right to
control the management of the LLC. * * * Because the Trustee
became the sole member of the LLC upon the Debtor’s
bankruptcy filing, the Trustee now controls, directly or
indirectly, all governance of that entity, including
decisions regarding liquidation of the entity’s assets”
The
court determined that the initial bankruptcy filing by
Husband and Wife caused their interests in A-Z Electronics
to become the sole property of the Trustee, and thus the
Trustee became the only party with the right to manage A-Z
Electronics LLC or choose whether it should file a
bankruptcy petition. Because it was Husband and Wife who
filed the bankruptcy petition for A-Z Electronics LLC and
not the Trustee, the bankruptcy petition was not properly
authorized or executed, and thus the petition would be
dismissed.
Case #2: Cognex Corp. v. VCode Holdings, Inc.,
2006 WL 3043129 (D.Minn., Oct. 24, 2006)
Cognex
Corporation filed a suit for declaratory judgment against
Acacia Research Corporation and its wholly-owned subsidiary
VData LLC and other subsidiaries, relating to disputed
intellectual property rights.
Cognex
argued that VData was the alter ego of Acacia, while the
latter argued that the traditional multi-pronged alter ego
analysis did not support a finding that VData was an alter
ego of Acacia. This analysis requires a corporate analysis
that has not changed much from the 19th Century,
and includes such factors as whether corporate formalities
were observed, corporate records were kept, or funds were
commingled, etc. The court rejected this form of analysis
because VData was an LLC, not a corporation.
“[T]his
test is premised on the assumption that the subsidiary is a
corporation that is subject to certain corporate
formalities. At the time that the test was developed, the
law of business organizations had yet to recognize statutory
limited liability companies. * * * And unlike a corporation,
an Illinois limited liability company does not issue stock,
does not appoint officers, and is not required to issue
annual reports. * * * * Though the proposed multi-factor
test is germane to the extent it examines control by a
parent entity, the underlying focus is whether the parent
exercises such control that the parent and subsidiary are
indistinguishable.”
The
court instead focused on the fact that the officers/managers
of the parent corporation and the LLC subsidiary were
effectively the same. Noting that there was “no reasonable
way” to distinguish when the officers/managers of the parent
were operating for its benefit instead of the subsidiary,
the court allowed plaintiff Cognex to proceed in its lawsuit
against VData LLC as the alter ego of Acacia Research
Corporation.
These
two cases further illustrate the dangers of using a
single-member LLC (SMLLC) for asset protection.
In the
bankruptcy context, the courts seem inclined to simply treat
the entity as another asset that the Trustee can take
possession of and liquidate to satisfy creditors.
This
effectively circumvents the so-called “charging order
protection” whereby a creditor of a debtor/member of an LLC
is usually restricted to what amounts to a lien against the
debtor/member’s economic rights to distributions (but
theoretically has no way to access the assets of the
entity).
Some
practitioners, including myself, would argue that charging
order protection makes little sense in the single-member
context anyway, since the purpose of restricting the
creditor’s remedy to a charging order is meant to protect
the non-debtor members of the LLC. This is of course
nonsensical in the single-member context where there are no
other interests to protect.
An
aggressive creditor facing a single-member LLC may try to
force the debtor into bankruptcy so as to circumvent the
charging order protection and allow the Trustee to liquidate
the entity for the creditor’s benefit.
Ironically, as in the A-Z Electronics LLC case, a Trustee
may try to use the LLC’s single member status to keep it out
of bankruptcy so that the Trustee’s ability to liquidate the
LLC remains unhindered by the LLC’s own reorganization.
The
other problem with single-member LLCs is that it is
comparatively easy to successfully claim that the LLC is the
alter ego of its owner. The courts are now starting to
recognize the absurdity of apply formality tests against an
entity that is intended by the legislature to be informal in
its structure and management. Yet, this leaves planners
guessing at just what the courts might look at to determine
alter ego.
Probably
a lot more litigation on this issue is coming, which
actually will be good in a way since then we will have some
indication where the courts are going. Until then, the
situation for single-member LLCs will be dangerous as the
courts discard the traditional alter ego tests and make up
new and unique ones on the spot.
Yes,
single-member LLCs are cool and useful for many tax and
business planning purposes. But they are not very cool for
asset protection planning. To the contrary, single-member
LLCs are a very dangerous tool for asset protection planning
because there are too many unknowns and the cases are
falling in favor of creditors.
Best
just to avoid single-member LLCs until the law shakes out.
We would
also be cautious of using obvious subterfuges to try to
avoid single-member status, such as having a small
membership percentage owned by the member’s living trust. It
would be an easy step for a court to impute that interest to
the debtor member, and then deem the entity to be a
single-member LLC.
Caution
should also be advised in community property states where
both husband and wife own all the shares in the LLC, since
it might be deemed to be the property of the community and
thus a single-member LLC.
Finally,
at least a couple of states -- Wyoming and Texas come to
mind -- have passed legislation to make clear that charging
order protection should still apply in the single-member
context. There is not enough aspirin or Scotch in the world
to allow us to consider the possible effect of such
legislation in a federal bankruptcy proceeding just yet.
Circular Transaction
Bites Client On Both Ends
Bermant v. Broadbent,
2006 WL 3692661 (D.Utah, Slip Copy Dec. 12, 2006)
Merrill
Scott & Associates, Ltd., was a Salt Lake City law firm that
had established a variety of entities to help their clients
with their tax planning, asset protection, and investment
needs. These entities included Gibraltar Permanente
Assurance, Ltd., an offshore insurance company, Legacy
Capital, and Fidelity Funding, Inc.
Self-proclaimed "Advisors to the Affluent", the Merrill
Scott aggressively marketed their services to high net worth
individuals through high-profile advertisements in the Robb
Report and similar media. Merrill Scott promised their
clients significant tax reduction and asset protection,
along with the potential for tremendous investment gains.
Like
most schemes that sound too good to be true, Merrill Scott’s
schemes were neither good nor true. The SEC concluded that
their investment deals were actually pyramid schemes where
the funds of later investors were used to pay off earlier
investors, and that Merrill Scott and its principals had
been embezzling client funds. The assets of Merrill Scott
and its associated entities were frozen, and a receiver was
appointed to marshal the assets for the benefit of creditors
and investors.
Jeffrey
C. Bermant made the unfortunate decision to contact Merrill
Scott after reading their advertisement in the Robb Report.
Thereafter, Merrill Scott prepared an impressive-looking
Master Financial Plan for Mr. Bermant, and Mr. Bermant paid
Merrill Scott $113,000 for initial planning and certain fees
for arranging certain loans.
One of
the strategies advocated by Merrill Scott was that Mr.
Bermant purchase Loss of Income Insurance (“LOI”) Policies
from Gibraltar Permanente, Ltd., an offshore insurance
company owned and controlled by Merrill Scott. Mr. Bermant
would pay $2 million in supposedly deductible premiums for
policies to protect his business from a loss of income.
Merrill Scott guaranteed that his premiums paid to Gibraltar
Permanente would be segregated away from the company's other
assets and held in a special account that would earn no less
than 5% annually.
The promise was that Mr. Bermant eventually would
receive premium refunds and earnings on those premiums
amounting to a total of $4.4 million after twenty years, and
that he would save over $1 million in income taxes over a
ten-year period.
As the
day approached for Mr. Bermant to start writing checks, he
became apprehensive. To encourage him to go ahead with the
transaction, Merrill Scott told Mr. Bermant that (contrary
to their earlier advice) he could borrow from other Merrill
Scott entities using the LOI account as collateral, i.e.,
Mr. Bermant would pay his premiums to Gibraltar Permanente,
take his deductions, and then his money would be immediately
loaned back to him.
Merrill Scott promised that they would lower the
interest rates on the loans and that Mr. Bermant would incur
only nominal tax-deductible interest expenses until Merrill
Scott returned the LOI premiums. When Merrill Scott returned
the LOI premiums to Mr. Bermant, then Mr. Bermant could use
those funds to reduce his loan balance.
Merrill
Scott also told Mr. Bermant that he could cancel the LOI
insurance at any time, with a full refund of premiums less a
5% surrender charge and less any outstanding loans secured
by the policy account. Merrill Scott gave a "cancellation
letter" to Mr. Bermant that purported to modify the terms of
the LOI policies issued by Gibraltar Permanente.
Satisfied that his LOI premiums would be safe with Merrill
Scott, Mr. Bermant set up two new LLCs to facilitate the
arrangement, with one LLC paying a $350,000 premium and the
other LLC paying a $1,650,000 premium. Mr. Bermant was named
as the insured on both policies. Mr. Bermant later claimed
that he had the LLCs purchase the LOI policies "as a matter
of convenience and tax return presentation."
After
having the LLCs pay the $2 million in premiums to Gibraltar
Permanente, Mr. Bermant then requested and received a $1.5
million loan from Legacy Capital, another Merrill Scott
entity. Legacy Capital transferred the $1.5 million directly
to Mr. Bermant, and Mr. Bermant gave a promissory note for
$1.5 million to Legacy Capital.
Later,
when things fell apart, Mr. Bermant claimed that Merrill
Scott really just loaned him $1.5 million of his own money
back, but of course that was not the representation made to
the IRS at the time of the transactions.
A year
after engaging in this transaction, Mr. Bermant told Merrill
Scott that he wanted to unwind it. Merrill Scott advised him
that it would be unwise to do this so soon because it would
draw IRS scrutiny. So, Mr. Bermant did nothing.
In the meantime, Merrill Scott collapsed and a
receiver was appointed.
Shortly
after the SEC had filed its action against Merrill Scott,
the IRS informed Mr. Bermant that it would disallow the
deductions that he had taken for the LOI premium payments.
The IRS has also
taken the position that Mr. Bermant owes $1.2 million in
back taxes, penalties and interest.
After
Merrill Scott was placed into receivership, Mr. Bermant
attempted to exercise his letter agreement to cancel the LOI
transaction and get his $2 million back. Not only did the
receiver refuse to cancel the $2 million transaction, but
the receiver also demanded that Mr. Bermant repay the $1.5
million that he received from Legacy Capital, pursuant to
the promissory note that he gave to it.
Mr.
Bermant also submitted a claim to the receiver demanding the
complete cancellation of his $1.5 million promissory note to
Legacy Capital, plus an additional $613,000 which apparently
represents the remaining $500,000 of the $2 million in LOI
“premiums” paid, plus the $113,000 planning fee.
This
case thus pitted the claims of Mr. Bermant versus Merrill
Scott against the claims of the Receiver versus Mr. Bermant.
Mr. Bermant argued that the Receiver merely stepped into the
shoes of Merrill Scott and thus is subject to all of his
claims and defenses against Merrill Scott. Conversely, the
Receiver argued that Mr. Bermant was simply another claimant
who should not be treated specially, and that Mr. Bermant's
claims for cancellation, set-off, and recoupment would
"unadvisedly undercut the broader equitable purposes the
receivership is designed to serve". The Receiver also argued
that Mr. Bermant's claims failed on their merits.
Mr.
Bermant essentially asked the court to disregard the
paperwork that evidenced the LOI policies and the loan to
him from Legacy Capital, and simply treat all the
transactions as having been between him and Merrill Scott.
But the court chose to hold Mr. Bermant's feet to the fire
by forcing him to recognize the transactions that he himself
entered into, stating:
"Mr. Bermant must prevail
upon the court to ignore the manner in which he actually
chose to structure his relationship with Merrill Scott and
instead enforce the parties' 'understanding' of what their
association truly entailed. Mr. Bermant has failed to
provide any persuasive authority that would support
disregarding the chosen structure of the various agreements
involving Merrill Scott."
The
court rejected Mr. Bermant's assertion that the letter from
Merrill Scott allowed him to terminate the LOI policies at
any time and get his money back.
"Far from an enforceable
contractual right, the letter from Mr. Landis is simply
further evidence that Merrill Scott and its clients
frequently attempted to retain the benefits that flowed from
structuring transactions in a certain way while never
intending to honor the commitments or recognize the
limitations attendant to utilizing such a structure. Mr.
Landis's letter may be an alteration to the 'understanding'
between Merrill Scott and Mr. Bermant, but the parties'
understanding of a relationship does not necessarily control
over the manner in which the parties finally structure their
association. This is especially the case here, where the
record indicates that the parties' understanding of their
association was purposefully inconsistent with the
mechanisms used to effect that association."
And
furthermore,
"Mr. Bermant is asking the
court to characterize the form of and parties to his various
transactions with Merrill Scott as mere formalities although
he fully recognized that those same formalities were
necessary to maximize the financial benefit he would gain by
making use of Merrill Scott's services."
Accordingly, the court ordered Mr. Bermant to pay the
receiver the $1.5 million that he received from Legacy
Capital. The court denied Mr. Bermant's claim for recoupment
of the other $500,000 and the $113,000 fee, and denied his
claim to set off the $1.5 million against the $2 million
that Gibraltar Permanente allegedly owes him. However, the
court declined to enter judgment for the Receiver for a
precise amount until the Receiver's claims for attorney fees
and interest were resolved.
The
lesson here is one that is often forgotten in asset
protection planning: There is a near total disconnect
between tax law and debtor-creditor law. How a structure or
transaction is treated for tax law purposes does not dictate
how it will be treated for debtor-creditor law purposes.
Here,
the IRS (correctly) disregarded this series of transactions,
disallowed Mr. Bermant's deductions, and imposed penalties,
while the Receiver was able to enforce the same transactions
for debtor-creditor purposes.
There
simply is no rule that transactions must be treated
consistently for tax and debtor-creditor purposes.
Note,
however, that there is a peculiar one-way street involving
tax filings. If you attempt to offer your own tax filings in
court as evidence of the characterization of a transaction
or entity, they may be inadmissible hearsay. However, if
your opponent offers your tax filings against you, they may
be allowed as your admissions. In other words, you should
presume that your tax filings will be used against you, not
for you.
This
case was more a matter of tax fraud than asset protection.
However, the lesson is the same from both perspectives: if
you engage in “wink and a nod” transactions, don’t be
surprised if someone not a party to the winking and nodding
enforces them according to their terms.
Asset Protection for
the Crashing Client
In re Middendorf,
___ B.R. ___, 2008 WL 331095 (Bkrtcy.D.Kan., No. 05-21748,
Feb. 1, 2008); see also Wittman v. Weir ( In re Weir ), 1990
WL 63072 (Bankr.D.Kan.1990)
A recent
bankruptcy court opinion rejected the contention by the
bankruptcy trustee that the debtors' pre-payment of taxes to
the IRS was either a preferential transfer or a fraudulent
transfer. FN1
Only a couple of
weeks before filing for Chapter 7 relief, debtors liquidated
$112,000 of their stocks, resulting in a $70,000 capital
gain. The week
before their Chapter 7 petition was filed, the debtors
pre-paid $22,250 of their anticipated federal capital gains
tax liability. The bankruptcy trustee challenged their tax
payment on both preferential transfer and fraudulent
transfer grounds, and demanded that the IRS return the
$22,250, which would have left the debtors with a
non-dischargeable tax debt.
The court first
rejected the trustee's claim that the transfer was
preferential. One of the elements of a preferential transfer
under Bankruptcy Code § 547 is that the payment be made "for
an antecedent debt owed before the date of the transfer".
Since the tax liability did not technically arise
until December 31 of the year when the pre-payment was made,
and the estimated tax payment was made on April 11 of that
year, this element of a preferential transfer was not met.
The court also
threw out the fraudulent transfer claim under Bankruptcy
Code § 548 on the basis that:
"debtors receive
reasonably equivalent value for tax pre-payments where they
face significant tax liability and obtain a dollar for
dollar credit against that potential liability and the right
to a refund if the tax debt is ultimately less. The Trustee
may no more recover the tax pre-payment as a fraudulent
transfer than he could recover pre-petition wage
withholdings under the same theory. There is nothing
nefarious about paying estimated tax liability out of the
very income to be taxed."
When a client
gets into financial difficulty, there are some things that
can and should be done immediately.
Tax Liability
The first one, as
indicated by the referenced case, is to calculate the
client's tax liabilities and pay those immediately. This
should be done for the previous tax year if returns have not
been filed yet, and for the current year with pre-payments
being made as quickly as possible. Clients will often go
into a funk as things go down and neglect their tax issues
("What's the point? I'm not making any money anyway!") as
they struggle to stay afloat financially. However, liability
for taxes related to the most recent few years is difficult
or impossible to discharge.
Therefore, consideration should be given to paying
otherwise non-dischargeable tax liabilities, including,
e.g., the trust fund portion of payroll tax liabilities,
before paying other creditors.
Inheritances
Clients may go
bust, but that doesn't mean that their parents and other
relatives have gone bust too. Even if creditors cannot get
anything out of your client, a creditor may linger around
and wait for somebody to die so that the creditor can then
reach the debtor’s inheritance.
You should ask
your client about inheritances likely to be received,
including how the client expects to receive it – outright,
in trust, etc. If the client will receive an inheritance
outright, you should suggest that the relative instead
provide that the gift is made to a discretionary spendthrift
trust so that it will be protected from the client's
creditors.
This is a sound
plan for most clients anyway, even for those not headed
south financially. We are often surprised to review asset
protection plans only to discover that a significant
inheritance will be received outright.
Cleaning Up
Just as a person
with a terminal illness needs to get their affairs in order,
so does a failing business need to get its affairs in order.
You may not be able to do prospective planning for a failing
client without involving yourself in a civil conspiracy, but
you can clean up the existing planning by making sure that
corporate annual meetings are held and properly documented
and that other necessary paperwork is put in order.
The client’s
current plan may not be the best, but you probably can make
it better by tying up loose ends.
Prepare documents as if they will be presented
tomorrow at a debtor's examination. Ensure that the state
filing fees for the client’s business entities fees are paid
up, and don't allow entities to lapse their registration.
Subtle Changes
Slight changes to
a client's planning structures may have substantial
benefits. For instance, adding one or more additional
members to a client’s single-member LLCs may significantly
bolster the protection afforded to the assets in the LLCs in
and out of bankruptcy.
A new member will need to pay reasonable value for
the interest, but better to have a friendly co-member buy in
to the LLC than to risk losing all the assets in the LLC.
Reorganize
S-Corporations
If a corporation,
partnership or non-resident alien ends up the owner of S
corporation stock as the result of the seizure and/or sale
of S corporation stock, negative tax consequences may arise
for the debtor and for other shareholders.
Consider reorganizing the corporation into an LLC
which elects S corporation status so that a creditor will be
limited to a charging order against the debtor-member's
economic rights to distributions (but will not own the
membership interest itself).
Face the Reality
Clients often do
not want to confront the reality that they will crash
financially. They hope beyond hope that something will save
them, whether a fantastic new business deal, a miraculous
rebound in the real estate market, or a winning lottery
ticket. With this hope, they keep their employees on board a
lot longer than they probably should, and continue to run
businesses that are losing money.
It is part of the
planner's job to help clients see that they have gone bust
or are headed there, and to help them plan accordingly. If
severe choices must be made, they should be made quickly,
otherwise they may make no difference. The sooner that a
client collapses their empire, often the better chance he or
she has at saving something and recovering more quickly.
Eliminate Credit
Clients may have
built up a great deal of credit in good times, but this
credit can be a noose in bad times. Credit encourages
clients to throw good money after bad. If creditors find out
about the debtor's remaining borrowing capacity, they likely
will take a hard line and try to require the debtor to
borrow from another creditor to pay them.
The IRS does this routinely in collection cases.
So, as tough as
it will seem to the client, open credit lines may need to be
eliminated. The less the client borrows in what is likely a
hopeless situation, the less deep the hole he can dig for
himself.
Control the Crash
When a client has
a financial crash, assets may be liquidated to satisfy
debts. If these sales result from sheriff’s levies and
execution sales, expect bottom dollar. Most clients can and
should liquidate their own assets. They will get better
prices, with lower costs of sale, and liquidation will be
more orderly.
Many creditors do
not like to incur the costs of liquidating assets,
particularly knowing that they will get bottom dollar, so
they often will be receptive to deals where the client
liquidates the asset but keeps some percentage of the
liquidation price. For a client, it is better to get this
piece than to get nothing, and to get better prices for the
assets, resulting in less debt in the end.
In the last real
estate bust, some attorneys became very good at
"non-judicial workouts", orderly liquidation of the assets
and other payment arrangements agreed by debtors and
creditors outside the courts. Often, a non-judicial workout
can result in a debtor left with more remaining assets, with
the benefit of avoiding the stigma of bankruptcy. Creditors
usually end up with more assets too, which is why they often
go along with such plans. It is worth trying, and there is
rarely a downside even if the deal can't be pulled off.
Prepare for Full
Disclosure
Trying to keep as
many of their assets as possible, many debtors will not want
to disclose their true financial status. However, most
creditors will refuse to cut deals unless a debtor is
completely honest about assets and income. If your debtor
client wants to cut a deal, prepare now for full disclosure
to the creditor and prepare answers to such questions as
"Where are you getting money now to live on?" and "Where did
that asset go?".
Summary
A client’s
impending financial failure does not signal the end of the
relationship for the business or estate planner. It just
signals that the relationship and type of planning have
changed. Troubled clients usually have as much need for
quality planning – often more - than clients whose
businesses are doing well. Don't let the fact that a client
is financially troubled keep you from doing good work for
him or her.
Stop Tax Haven
Abuse Act
Senators
Levin and Obama have introduced Senate Bill 681 to address
what they perceive as some of the worst abuses involving the
offshore havens. According to Senator Levin's press release,
the key features S.681 are:
ESTABLISH PRESUMPTIONS TO COMBAT OFFSHORE SECRECY by
allowing U.S. tax and securities law enforcement to presume
that non-publicly traded, offshore corporations and trusts
are controlled by the U.S. taxpayers who formed them or sent
them assets, unless the taxpayer proves otherwise;
IMPOSE
TOUGHER REQUIREMENTS ON U.S. TAXPAYERS USING OFFSHORE
SECRECY JURISDICTIONS by listing 34 jurisdictions which have
already been named in IRS court filings as probable
locations for U.S. tax evasion;
AUTHORIZE SPECIAL MEASURES TO STOP OFFSHORE TAX ABUSES by
giving Treasury authority to take special measures against
foreign jurisdictions and financial institutions that impede
U.S. tax enforcement;
STRENGTHEN DETECTION OF OFFSHORE ACTIVITIES by requiring
U.S. financial institutions that open accounts for foreign
entities controlled by U.S. clients, open accounts in
offshore secrecy jurisdictions for U.S. clients, or
establish entities in offshore secrecy jurisdictions for
U.S. clients, to report such actions to the IRS;
CLOSE
OFFSHORE TRUST LOOPHOLES by taxing offshore trust income
used to buy real estate, artwork and jewelry for U.S.
persons, and treating as trust beneficiaries those persons
who actually receive offshore trust assets;
STRENGTHEN PENALTIES on tax shelter promoters by increasing
the maximum fine to 150% of their ill-gotten gains, and on
corporate insiders who hide offshore stock holdings by
increasing the maximum fine on them to $1 million per
violation of U.S. securities laws;
STOP TAX
SHELTER PATENTS by prohibiting the U.S. Patent and Trademark
Office from issuing patents for "inventions designed to
minimize, avoid, defer, or otherwise affect liability for
Federal, State, local, or foreign tax"; and
REQUIRE
HEDGE FUNDS AND COMPANY FORMATION AGENTS TO KNOW THEIR
OFFSHORE CLIENTS by requiring them to establish anti-money
laundering programs like other U.S. financial institutions,
under regulations to be issued by the Treasury Department.
Mr. Bob
Roach, the Senior Investigator for the Senate Permanent
Subcommittee on Investigations was a guest of Jay Adkisson
on a panel at the Southern California Tax & Estate Planning
Forum in San Diego last October. Mr. Roach spoke at great
length on S.681 and their ramifications for offshore
planning.
The
"must listen" audiotape from the panel, which included
several other great speakers on asset protection related
topics, is available by contacting Mr. Lonnie McGee at (619)
696-6773.
Captive News
A great
wealth of free information, IRS rulings and regulations, and
collection of pertinent case law regarding captives is
available on
our website's captive insurance section.
Treasury Abandons New
Challenges
to Captives
On
February 19, the IRS formally abandoned its most recent
challenge to captive insurance arrangements, which sought to
deny the ability of captives to deduct their contributions
to their reserves.
The IRS
wanted to take the position that a captive insurance company
was just an artifice to get around the rules that prevent an
ordinary business from deducting its reserves against future
claims -- something that an insurance company can do.
The IRS
backed away from this position, however, after intense
lobbying by a number of industry groups, which is not
surprising when one considers that most of the Fortune 500
companies already have captives.
IRS Issues Guidance on
Segregated
Cell Captives
In
Revenue Ruling 2008-8, the IRS ruled that so called
Segregated Portfolio Companies (SPCs) and Protected Cell
Companies (PCCs) must meet the risk-shifting and
risk-distribution requirements for each cell as if each cell
were a stand-alone insurance company.
Various
promoters have attempted to make captives cheaper and easier
for smaller businesses that otherwise could not qualify for
a captive insurance arrangement by lumping them together
into various rent-a-captive and risk pool deals. The new
guidance from the IRS effectively puts the kabosh on most of
these arrangements.
Jay
Adkisson has released his latest book,
Adkisson's Captive Insurance Companies: An Introduction to Captives,
Closely-Held Insurance Companies and Risk Retention Groups,
which is available from
Amazon.com and through
Barnes & Noble and other booksellers.
Subscribe
Past Issues:
- March 2005 html
| Acrobat
- At a Glance
- Civil Conspiracy from Fraudulent Transfer
- Fraudulent Transfer Opinion Summaries
- Efficacy of Foreign Asset Protection Trusts
- Upcoming Events
- Report from Quatloosia
Past Issues of
The
Riser Report
|