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Asset Protection for Corporate
Officers & Directors
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The 2005 Bankruptcy Reforms:
Salt Into the Wound of Sarbanes-Oxley
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 dramatically
expanded the duties and responsibilities and the potential
liabilities of corporate officers and directors. The new
Act introduced strict rules relating to conflicts of interests,
such as personal loans for directors. Sarbanes-Oxley also
requires corporate officers and directors to make certain
reports and disclosures relating to internal controls. Additionally,
the Statute of Limitations for securities fraud was expanded
to the longer of five years or two years from disclosure
of the fraud, and whistleblowers have greatly expanded protection
as well as a right to sue for special damages.
There were no shortages of securities class-action lawsuits
even prior to Sarbanes-Oxley, but after its passage, litigation
became much more personal, especially for outside directors.
To settle their liability on the accounting fraud claims
alone, ten outside directors of WorldCom agreed to pay $18
million from their personal assets, which represented an
estimated 20% of their net worth. Another $36 million was
paid from their D&O insurance. Similarly, ten former
Enron directors agreed to personally pay $13 million as part
of a $168 million settlement for fraudulent accounting practices.
Stung by large claims against the D&O policies issued
to these unfortunate directors, the insurance carriers have
tightened up their policies and expanded their exclusions.
Future corporate officers and directors who are caught up
in similar circumstances may have to litigate with their
own insurance carriers to provide defense and coverage. Also,
a sustained series of financial collapses, such as the savings & loans
crisis of the 1980’s, might challenge the solvency
of a particular insurance carrier and its ability to timely
pay claims.
Corporate officers and directors now face the specter of
personal liability unrecompensed by their company or its
insurance carrier for shareholder losses, whistleblower claims,
and similar types of liabilities. Such liability in the past
would have been met with personal bankruptcy. Or, with little
foresight or strategy, a person expecting difficulties could
simply move to Texas or Florida, where the creditor exemption
for homestead was unlimited. It was also easy for corporate
officers to load millions into their ERISA-protected pension
plans knowing that they would be protected from any future
creditors as well.
Not any more.
The Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection
Act of 2005 appears to specifically target corporate officers
and directors so that they will not be able to protect any
significant assets in bankruptcy. While the new Bankruptcy
Act significantly pared down the exemptions available to
all debtors, it virtually eliminates any meaningful protection
for those who are successfully sued for securities fraud
or breach of fiduciary duty.
The key provision is the new section 522(q), which limits
any exemption existing under State law to $125,000 for several
types of debts including those arising from:
(i) any violation of the Federal securities laws (as defined
in section 3(a)(47) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934),
any State securities laws, or any regulation or order issued
under Federal securities laws or State securities laws;
(ii) fraud, deceit, or manipulation in a fiduciary capacity
or in connection with the purchase or sale of any security
registered under section 12 or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 or under section 6 of the Securities Act of 1933;
and,
(iii) any civil remedy under section 1964 of title 18 (this
is the civil RICO remedy provision).
These are, of course, three of the most common avenues to
the personal liability of a corporate officer or director.
For persons who are successfully sued under one of these
theories, the effect is that they will not be able to protect
more than $125,000 in their house, regardless of how much
the state allows, nor will they be able to protect more than
$125,000 in their pension or similar types of retirement
plans. In other words, if you are successfully sued for securities
fraud, breach of fiduciary duty or civil RICO, you will not
be able to protect much more than 250,000 in your combined
home and retirement plans, and a few personal effects.
If all this isn’t bad enough, prospective debtors
are also limited in the type of pre-bankruptcy planning that
they can do. A new section 522(o) creates a 10-year period
during which the bankruptcy trustee can claw back non-exempt
assets that were converted to exempt assets to avoid creditors.
Other provisions of the new Bankruptcy Act create numerous
other limitations for debtors to protect assets.
So how about those asset protection trusts that you read
about all the time? Form one in the Cook Islands, or even
in Alaska or Delaware these days, and your assets in them
will be bulletproof from creditor claims, right?
Wrong.
Stung by criticism in a New York Times article about a “loophole
for the rich” in the new Bankruptcy Act, Congress passed
a new section 548(e) that allows a bankruptcy trustee to
clawback assets that were transferred to an asset protection
trust within ten years of the filing of the voluntary or
involuntary bankruptcy petition, if the transfer was meant
to diminish the rights of creditors. Since the very purpose
of an asset protection trust is to diminish the rights of
creditors, the import is that assets transferred to such
trusts can be easily backed out by the bankruptcy trustee.
The new 548(e) not only applies to asset protection trusts,
which are self-settled trusts that one creates for his own
benefit, but also applied to “like devices”.
Congress did not attempt to define “like devices,” but
one could reasonably infer that it is anything that has a
specific purpose for protecting assets while allowing the
person who created the structure to have the beneficial use
of those assets.
Congress did not need to worry about asset protection trusts.
The bankruptcy courts had never respected them anyway, and
in a series of cases the courts simply treated the assets
in such trusts as part of the bankruptcy estate. In one case,
involving former derivatives trader Stephen J. Lawrence,
the court ordered him to provide information relating to
his offshore trust and when he refused, the court cast him
into prison for contempt. Lawrence went into jail in August
of 2000, and was still in the pokey as of the writing of
this article.
The truth is that foreign asset protection trusts have a
chance of working if you flee the jurisdiction of the U.S.
courts when things get dicey. Of course, doing that may cause
your other creditor protections, such as homestead, to dissolve,
and you may be precluded from defending the claims against
you under what is known as the “fugitive disentitlement
doctrine”. The new Domestic Asset Protection Trusts
that are heavily marketed by trust companies based in Alaska,
Delaware and a few other states have little chance of protecting
assets under the new 548(e).
To make doubly sure that corporate officers and directors
could not hide their wealth in asset protection trusts, Congress
specifically mandated that in interpreting 548(e) “a
transfer includes a transfer made in anticipation of any
money judgment, settlement, civil penalty, equitable order,
or criminal fine incurred by, or which the debtor believed
would be incurred by” a violation of the securities
fraud and securities registration laws. While this language
seems redundant, it sends a clear message: Persons active
in the securities industry should be personally liable for
their decisions, and this liability should not be defeated
by asset protection subterfuges.
So what does work?
There is an old adage that “As the laws get tighter,
the lawyers get smarter.” Asset protection will not
go away, but it will necessarily become more complex and
sophisticated to meet such evolutions in debtor-creditor
law as the new Bankruptcy Act.
It is important is to keep assets off of the personal balance
sheet, so that if there is a bankruptcy the assets will not
show up in either the debtor’s schedules or in any
recent history of past transactions. This can be legally
accomplished through sophisticated estate and business planning
done well in advance of any potential creditor problems.
Estate planning is a legitimate form of personal planning
that does not by itself raise unnecessary suspicions of anti-creditor
planning. While the new Act makes clear that one cannot create
a trust for one’s own benefit and still hope that the
assets will be protected from creditors, it did not impact
ordinary, non-self-settled trusts at all. One can still,
for instance, create a trust for one’s children or
grandchildren and convey valuable assets to that trust. So
long as it is done at least several years before problems
arise, both the transfer and the trust should be respected
and stand-up even in bankruptcy.
The key to making estate planning perform an asset protection
function is to avoid utilizing gifts as the method of transferring
assets to the trust. Gifts by their very nature are without
reasonably equivalent value and, thus, are susceptible to
being set aside as fraudulent transfers. Instead, for-value
transfers such as self-canceling installment notes and private
annuities should be utilized for transfers. While these transfers
are much more complicated from a tax perspective, they are
much safer from a debtor-creditor law perspective.
Business planning can also have the effect of moving assets
off of the future debtor’s balance sheet and into an
entity where a creditor will have a difficult time accessing
them to pay a judgment. By contributing assets to a limited
partnership, the assets are effectively transformed from
a form that is easy for creditors to collect upon into partnership
interests against which a creditor will be limited to a charging
order that restricts the creditor’s rights to receiving
the distributions that the debtor would have normally received.
Of course, if no distributions are made to the debtor’s
interests, the creditor gets no distributions either, and
the case law has, with only rare exceptions, protected the
valuable assets within the limited partnership from creditors’ collection
attempts.
Future strategies may involve the creative use of life insurance
and annuities in the numerous states that offer substantial
levels of protection to those products when properly structured
and drafted. Although Congress eviscerated some of the most
common forms of debtor planning, it did not seek to change
the existing state exemptions for those products, although
they will still be potentially subject to the ten-year limitations
period for the conversion of non-exempt assets into exempt
assets. However, by combining sophisticated forms of insurance
with certain forms of ERISA planning, plans could be created
that would offer formidable barriers to even the most sophisticated
creditors.
An important factor in asset protection planning has always
been to do the planning well in advance of creditors. Prior
to the new Bankruptcy Act, the required amount of time for
a debtor to reach a degree of comfort that transfers would
not be reversed was sometimes measured in months, or, at
worst, a couple of years. Future asset protection planning
will require much greater foresight and passage of time before
the same levels of comfort can be achieved. In other words,
if you want protection that will have a chance of standing
up, you need to start that planning as soon as possible in
the hope that some significant water will pass under the
bridge before it is challenged.
A final word of advice is to avoid those asset protection
solutions that are heavily marketed. Such solutions will
not escape the notice of creditors, who may attempt to lobby
Congress for additional changes to the bankruptcy code so
as to mitigate the effects of those solutions. Instead, seek
personalized solutions that have substantial purposes not
ordinarily related to asset protection, but which have the
effect of challenging those assets unpalatable to creditors.
The best asset protection plan is one that is so subtle that
it cannot be readily identified by creditors or by the court
as an asset protection plan.
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