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Section 503. Exceptions to Spendthrift Provision
Comment This section exempts the claims of certain categories of creditors from the effects of a spendthrift restriction and specifies the remedies such exemption creditors may take to satisfy their claims. The exception in subsection (b)(1) for judgments or orders to support a beneficiary’s child or current or former spouse is in accord with Restatement (Third) of Trusts Section 59(a) (Tentative Draft No. 2, approved 1999), Restatement (Second) of Trusts Section 157(a) (1959), and numerous state statutes. It is also consistent with federal bankruptcy law, which exempts such support orders from discharge. The effect of this exception is to permit the claimant for unpaid support to attach present or future distributions that would otherwise be made to the beneficiary. Distributions subject to attachment include distributions required by the express terms of the trust, such as mandatory payments of income, and distributions the trustee has otherwise decided to make, such as through the exercise of discretion. Subsection (b)(1), unlike Section 504, does not authorize the spousal or child claimant to compel a distribution from the trust. Section 504 authorizes a spouse or child claimant to compel a distribution to the extent the trustee has abused a discretion or failed to comply with a standard for distribution. Subsection (b)(1) refers both to “support” and “maintenance” in order to accommodate differences among the States in terminology employed. No difference in meaning between the two terms is intended. The definition of “child” in subsection (a) accommodates the differing approaches States take to defining the class of individuals eligible for child support, including such issues as whether support can be awarded to stepchildren. However the State making the award chooses to define “child” will be recognized under this Code, whether the order sought to be enforced was entered in the same or different State. For the definition of “state,” which includes Puerto Rico and other American possessions, see Section 103(17). The definition of “child” in subsection (a) is not exclusive. The definition clarifies that a “child” includes an individual awarded child support in any state. The definition does not expressly include but neither does it exclude persons awarded child support in some other country or political subdivision, such as a Canadian province. The exception in subsection (b)(2) for a judgment creditor who has provided services for the protection of a beneficiary’s interest in the trust is in accord with Restatement (Third) of Trusts Section 59(b) (Tentative Draft No. 2, approved 1999), and Restatement (Second) of Trusts Section 157(c) (1959). This exception allows a beneficiary of modest means to overcome an obstacle preventing the beneficiary’s obtaining services essential to the protection or enforcement of the beneficiary’s rights under the trust. See Restatement (Third) of Trusts Section 59 cmt. d (Tentative Draft No. 2, approved 1999). Subsection (b)(3), which is similar to Restatement (Third) of Trusts Section 59 cmt. a (Tentative Draft No. 2, approved 1999), exempts certain governmental claims from a spendthrift restriction. Federal preemption guarantees that certain federal claims, such as claims by the Internal Revenue Service, may bypass a spendthrift provision no matter what this Code might say. The case law and relevant Internal Revenue Code provisions on the exception for federal tax claims are collected in George G. Bogert & George T. Bogert, The Law of Trusts and Trustees Section 224 (Rev. 2d ed. 1992); and 2A Austin W. Scott & William F. Fratcher, The Law of Trusts Section 157.4 (4th ed. 1987). Regarding claims by state governments, this subsection recognizes that States take a variety of approaches with respect to collection, depending on whether the claim is for unpaid taxes, for care provided at an institution, or for other charges. Acknowledging this diversity, subsection (c) does not prescribe a rule, but refers to other statutes of the State on whether particular claims are subject to or exempted from spendthrift provisions. Unlike Restatement (Third) of Trusts Section 59(2) (Tentative Draft No. 2, approved 1999), and Restatement (Second) of Trusts Section 157(b) (1959), this Code does not create an exception to the spendthrift restriction for creditors who have furnished necessary services or supplies to the beneficiary. Most of these cases involve claims by governmental entities, which the drafters concluded are better handled by the enactment of special legislation as authorized by subsection (b)(3). The drafters also declined to create an exception for tort claimants. For a discussion of the exception for tort claims, which has not generally been recognized, see Restatement (Third) of Trusts Section 59 Reporter’s Notes to cmt. a (Tentative Draft No. 2, approved 1999). For a discussion of other exceptions to a spendthrift restriction, recognized in some States, see George G. Bogert & George T. Bogert, The Law of Trusts and Trustees Section 224 (Rev. 2d ed. 1992); and 2A Austin W. Scott & William F. Fratcher, The Law of Trusts Sections 157-157.5 (4th ed. 1987). Subsection (c) provides that the only remedy available to an exception creditor is attachment of present or future distributions of present or future distributions. Depending on other creditor law of the state, additional remedies may be available should a beneficiary’s interest not be subject to a spendthrift provision. Section 501, which applies in such situations, provides that the creditor may reach the beneficiary’s interest under that section by attachment or “other means.” Subsection (c), similar to Section 501, clarifies that the court has the authority to limit the creditor’s relief as appropriate under the circumstances. 2005 Amendment. The amendment rewrote this section. The section previously provided:
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