Adkisson & Riser's
June-July 2005
Developments
In Asset Protection
and Wealth Preservation |
In This Issue
In this edition of Developments, we
transition to our new publishing schedule, whereby new editions
will come out only every other month.
This issue discusses perhaps the best
asset protection and risk management tool available to businesses,
which is that of captive in-surance. We examine the just-released
Revenue Ruling 2005-40 which deals with insurance arrangements.
Bill Campbell returns as a guest author to contribute a piece
on workers’ compensation captives. Most people are not
familiar with litigation expense policies, and so we give
an overview of this type of policy, along with Risk Retention
Groups. We also examine several new cases on fraudulent transfers,
as well as one of the first cases to interpret the new Bankruptcy
Act – and perhaps which raises more questions about
the effect of that Act on state homestead exemption than it
answers.
The Report from Quatloosia examines
the phenomena of life settlements, and the potential benefits
and pitfalls of such arrangements. Enjoy!
Editor
CAPTIVE INSURANCE:
Benefits and Responsibilities
by Jay Adkisson and Chris Riser
Asset protection is fundamentally about risk management.
Insurance is the most basic risk management tool. Its purpose
is to transfer certain risks at a fixed cost. When commercial
insurance costs outweigh the benefits of transferring certain
risks to a third party, self-insurance is an option. When
commercial insurance for certain risks is simply unavailable,
self-insurance is a necessity. If the costs of commercial
insurance outweigh the benefits because the potential insured's
loss history and risk profile is better than others in the
pool of insureds, there is pricing inefficiency which benefits
the insurance company, and usually not the insured. However,
where the insurance company is owned by the insured or the
owners of the insured (i.e., it is a "captive" insurance company),
the insured and the insured's owners can benefit from the
insureds favorable loss history. Why not retain those potentially
large underwriting profits?
Captive insurance companies often are established as a sister
company to its insureds, usually as a subsidiary of the parent
holding company that owns the insureds. While contract and
insurance law determines the insurance relationship between
the parties, tax law determines the insurance relationship
between the insureds and the IRS and the captive and the IRS.
For the captive insurance arrangement to be respected as insurance
for tax purposes, the insurance arrangements must be bona
fide, must shift and distribute risks adequately, and the
parent, the captive and the insureds must be separate entities
for legal and tax purposes. Treatment as insurance for tax
purposes can be important so that premiums may be deductible
by the insureds and so that the captive will be treated as
an insurance company for tax purposes.
A captive insurance company allows a business to take on
favorable layers of insurance risk, and to administer their
own claims when they desire. They are such efficient risk
management (i.e., insurance cost management) tools that many
major U.S. corporations have their own captive insurance companies.
This article will examine captive insurance companies, their
advantages, and their limitations as risk management tools.
A future article will address tax issues related to captive
insurance companies.
You Already Insure Yourself - Whether You
Realize It Or Not.
If a liability claim arises for which you and not a third
party insurance company will pay your litigation expenses
- and damages if you lose - you're self-insuring. In other
words, if you're "naked" with respect to a particular risk,
you're self-insuring for that risk whether you realize it
or not.
Self-insurance is often deliberate. If a particular type
of insurance coverage is so expensive that it is economically
unreasonable to purchase the coverage, the person or business
exposed to that risk will take on the risk rather than pay
an insurance company to assume it.
Often, however, people and businesses are exposed to risks
which they unwittingly assume. For example, if you breezed
past (or didn't read at all) the section of your business's
general liability policy that excludes coverage for sexual
harassment claims, you may not realize that your business
bears the risk of sexual harassment claims against you and
its other employees. You're self-insuring for sexual harassment
claims whether you know it or not. If a claim arises, the
funds to defend - and potentially pay - the claim come out
of your business's coffers. If you know you've assumed that
risk and others, because you've decided that commercial insurance
coverage is too expensive, perhaps you set aside a reserve
of funds to cover these risks. Essentially, you're setting
aside an insurance fund for yourself. Unfortunately, those
funds are exposed to creditors and reserves set aside for
such risks cannot be deducted from your business's taxable
income for tax purposes.
A captive insurance company helps you to formalize and tailor
your risk management program, and may allow you to reserve
for these self-insured risks in a tax-advantaged way.
Claims Resolution
The captive insurance arrangement allows you to resolve your
own claims. This gives you the ability to settle claims early
if you desire, or to refuse to settle if you think that is
in your better long-term interests. It also gives you the
ability to select your own attorneys - attorneys who will
look out for your best interests as opposed to those of a
commercial insurance company. This means that you will have
substantial control over the litigation process, letting you
dictate the course of the litigation rather than standing
by feeling helpless.
Draft Your Own Policies
A considerable advantage of using a captive is that it allows
the business owner to custom-tailor the insurance to fit the
business's needs, and to include or exclude certain risks
as desired. For example, a property insurance policy might
be drafted to cover losses due to terrorism or governmental
action (such as changes in environmental laws).
Some smaller captives might issue policies that don't cover
liability for damages to a third-party claimant, but rather
provide coverage for litigation expenses (attorney fees, expert
witness expenses, discovery expenses, etc.). This may make
particularly good sense for a business exposed to the risk
of frivolous litigation, where the likelihood of a plaintiff
prevailing is low, but defense costs are high. With a litigation
expense policy, the business can create a "war chest" to fund
future defense litigation.
The effect of these policies is psychological as well as
practical. A litigation expense policy effectively tells a
plaintiff's attorney, "Our insurance policy will pay to fully
litigate the claim, but won't provide anything for you to
collect." Facing a fully-funded legal battle without the easy
pickings of insurance funds is attractive to few plaintiffs
and, more importantly perhaps, few plaintiffs' attorneys.
Reducing Overall Cost of Insurance
Another potentially useful function of a captive is to cover
large commercial insurance deductibles. In that case, the
business is retaining the risk - in the captive - of small
claims and the first layer of larger claims, while shifting
the "worst-case scenario" risk to a commercial insurer. Significantly
increasing a deductible in a commercial policy will lower
the cost of the commercial policy, so that a business with
good risk management practices and few claims can capture
the cost benefits by paying premiums for that first layer
of risk to the captive, and retaining underwriting profits
in the captive.
That leads to another benefit of captives. Captive insurance
arrangements often are attractive because of pricing inefficiencies
in the commercial insurance markets. If a business's loss
histories have established that the anticipated cost of claims
will be less than annual premiums in the long run, then moving
to a captive insurance arrangement often makes sense. Likewise,
where a business is unfavorably underwritten because it is
grouped into a category of business with a bad loss history,
the cost of a captive insurance program may beat the cost
of a commercial insurance program. For a look at this phenomenon
in the workers compensation insurance area, see the article
by Bill Campbell in this issue of Developments.
A captive can also function as a reinsurance company - that
is, as an insurance company for insurance companies. This
is common where the insurance in the captive program is of
a type that requires that the direct insurer be admitted (licensed,
essentially) to issue insurance policies in the insured's
state by the state's insurance commissioner. In a so-called
(and perfectly legal) "fronting" arrangement, an admitted
carrier will issue the policy to the insured, and the insured's
captive insurer will reinsure some (or all) of the risk of
the "fronting" insurer. This allows the captive to assume
most of the risk and to earn most of the premium, less a fronting
fee charged by the fronting insurer.
Tool for Value Shifting
From an asset protection perspective, the primary benefit
to a captive insurance company is that it gives a mechanism
to transfer value out of the operating business in a legitimate
and a tax-efficient manner. Wealth that would have been accumulated
in the business, distributed to the owners is removed from
the reach of creditors. For example, assume that an operating
business is able to justify the payment of $500,000 per year
in insurance premiums to its captive, which holds those premiums
as actuarially calculated reserves to pay future claims, or
as surplus once it is no longer needed as reserves. Over ten
years, that $5 million has been quietly moved out of the operating
company. Of course, those funds don't sit in a safe as a pile
of cash. The funds are invested to earn income and gains.
If the business makes no claims over that ten year period,
the captive may have considerably more than $5 million in
assets. Although there are some restrictions placed by insurance
commissioners on the investment of some or all of a captive
insurer's reserves, capital and surplus, investment rules
for captives are more relaxed than those for commercial insurers.
The captive may be able to invest in the owners' related businesses
and in new business ventures. From an asset protection perspective,
the captive may also be able to function as a secured lender
to strip equity from other valuable property of the owners.
Assuming that the premiums are reasonable and justified from
an actuarial perspective, it will be very difficult for a
subsequent creditor to prove that the transfers were not "for
value" transfers for purposes of the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer
Act. Moreover, the issue is unlikely to arise at all, because
insurance premium payments made in the ordinary course of
business are rarely a red flag to attract the attention of
a court or a creditor.
Of course, the captive itself must be protected from the
creditors of the captive's owners. At the very least, the
captive should be owned through a limited partnership or limited
liability company so as to give charging order protection
to the stock in the captive.
Jurisdictions of Formation
Where to form a captive? Captive insurance companies often
are formed offshore, in so called "debtor-haven" and "tax-haven"
jurisdictions. No local taxes and lax regulation made life
relatively easy for many captives before some of the offshore
jurisdictions began to tighten up captive regulation.
Over the last few decades, U.S. states have slowly (and more
rapidly in the last several years) enacted captive insurance
company legislation, with Vermont leading the way in size
of its captive insurance industry. Nearly half of the states
have captive legislation, and several U.S. jurisdictions,
including Vermont, Hawaii, South Carolina, Arizona, Montana,
Utah, and the District of Columbia are aggressively pursuing
and attracting new captive business.
As the captive market has matured and as offshore captive
jurisdictions have increased captive regulatory oversight,
offshore captive regulation in the larger offshore jurisdictions
has become comparable to U.S. captive regulation. So, from
a regulatory perspective, there may be little difference between
using an offshore captive or a domestic captive. Rather, the
choice of jurisdiction will depend on other factors, such
as whether the captive primarily will be insuring risks within
or outside the U.S., and other concerns.
Many who are newly considering a captive insurance program
want to start with the question, "Where should we form the
captive?" Though relatively important, the choice of captive
jurisdiction is not nearly as important as a number of other
factors in considering and designing a captive insurance program.
Forming and Managing a Captive
The term "captive formation" (often used by offshore service
providers, in particular) is a very misleading in that it
implies that forming the company is the beginning and end
of the captive process. In fact, the process of putting together
a captive insurance program involves considerably more than
forming a corporation and filling out an insurance license
application. The very first step is to investigate the economic
feasibility of a captive program. The initial steps can be
relatively informal, but if the initial inquiry leads to the
preliminary conclusion that a captive makes economic sense,
a formal feasibility study involving an actuarial firm should
be undertaken. The study will examine the types of risks to
be underwritten, the layers and levels of risk to be assumed
by the captive, the layers and levels of risk to be shifted
to reinsurers, the premiums and reserves that will be required,
and an analysis of one or more potential captive jurisdictions.
If the formal feasibility study validates the captive concept,
a detailed application, including the feasibility study and
a business plan, is submitted to the insurance commission
in the jurisdiction where the captive is proposed to be formed.
If the application is approved, the company is formed. After
the company is formed and the required minimum reserves have
been deposited in the company's bank account, the insurance
commissioner issues the insurance license and the company
can begin business.
Treatment of insurance contracts as insurance for tax purposes
and treatment of a company as an insurance company for tax
purposes has little to do with the company's insurance license.
First, the insurance company must be operated as an insurance
company. It truly must be in the business of insurance and
must earn the majority of its revenue from insurance business.
As a licensed insurance company and as a company legitimately
in the business of insurance, the captive must employ or contract
with auditors, attorneys, accountants, actuaries, insurance
managers, claims managers and other supporting service providers.
These services don't come cheap. However, in order that a
captive has made it through the formation and licensing process,
it already has been determined that it is economically feasible
to bear these costs and still make a profit.
Implementing a small captive insurance program usually involves
first-year costs of about $100,000, including the legal and
other professional work necessary to fit the captive into
the owners' existing business and estate planning structures.
Ongoing annual costs for management and professional fees
usually are about $50,000. Obviously, these cost levels mean
that captives don't make economic sense for many smaller businesses.
This is one of the reasons that initial feasibility studies
are particularly important.
A captive insurance program is one of the best risk management
and asset protection tools available for many businesses and
business owners, but it does not come without significant
responsibilities and costs.
__________
CAPTIVES FOR WORKERS'
COMPENSATION
by Bill Campbell
In today's volatile workers' compensation insurance market,
many companies find themselves in untenable situations. Increasing
premiums and claims abuse can drive costs to levels unheard
of just a few years ago.
The good news is that many legislatures passed laws for relief.
But, while the playing field may be leveling, insurance companies
are typically slow to react.
Insurance companies by nature only have rearview mirrors,
as they must look back to look forward. Actuarial data must
be collected for an extended period of time in order for carriers
to make predictions on the losses they can expect.
Even though insurers are in the business of covering risks,
they are very averse to taking any risk at all. As a result,
we have yet to see much downward movement in workers' compensation
premiums. Even when we have seen reductions, there have been
increases in other areas, such as classification rates, that
result in no improvement at all.
With this environment of increasing premiums and costs, many
firms are turning to the alternative funding arena for workers'
compensation. Large deductible plans have become increasingly
popular. These plans allow a company to elect to pay all claims
up to an agreed amount. At the per claim cap, the insurance
carrier takes over. Large deductible plans usually have an
aggregate stop point to save a firm from catastrophic losses.
For many firms, the use of a captive insurance company to
pay the claims can be the tax break cherry on top of these
plans.
This discussion, while specific to California, will apply
to most programs across the US. Please check for any variations
your state may have on the information presented here.
Components of a workers' compensation plan
There are several components to every workers' compensation
policy that must be in place no matter what type of plan a
firm elects to employ:
-
Security- All workers' compensation policies must
be fronted by an admitted carrier. This satisfies the
Director of Industrial Relations as to the validity of
the program. The admitted carrier in essence just lends
its name to the program.
-
Claims Administration- Usually supplied by the
carrier or a third party administrator. Each will charge
a per claim fee for the service. This provides labor code
compliant claims management.
-
Aggregate Stop Loss Re-Insurance- Low cost policies
obtained from a large re-insurance company to limit the
annual cost of the program. The attachment point for these
policies is usually at $1,000,000 for all claims in a
year.
-
Specific Stop Loss- Used to provide capitation
for large single claims. These policies usually attach
at $250,000 on a per claim basis.
-
Loss Fund- There must be a fund in place to pay
all current and future claims. The fronting company will
only accept a properly secured and maintained fund. A
captive is often used here.
Captives
A "Captive" is a closely held insurance company whose insurance
business is primarily supplied by and controlled by its owners,
and in which the original insureds are the principal beneficiaries.
In a captive, the shareholders-insureds actively participate
in decisions influencing underwriting, operations and investments.
There are two types of captives generally used for workers'
compensation. A company that wants to retain complete control
over the operation, investment activity, and claims payments
of the owned captive should seriously consider the single
owner or pure captive.
The pure captive will cost more to set up and, depending
on the level of involvement the firm elects, involves more
hands on time for administrators. A company can operate its
own insurance division to maintain complete control over the
captive, but a TPA must be employed for claims management.
The other and by far more popular type used in the workers'
compensation arena is the captive owned by an organization
that is not one of the policy holders, commonly referred to
as the rent-a-captive. These captives can be run by a broker,
a re-insurer, or, more commonly, by a fronting insurance carrier.
The fees for this type of captive are usually much lower
than the initial capital required to start a single owner
captive. However, they do not offer nearly the same amount
of flexibility. Investment opportunities are limited, and
the managing company controls stock options and dividend payments.
Factors Prompting the Formation of a Captive
The major driving force in pushing companies to the captive
market has been the high cost of premiums. Several other factors
are also contributing to the movement.
There has been an overall lack of broad coverage availability
as carriers leave the market, resulting in a loss of competition
and a reduction of capacity, and thereby driving premiums
up.
With the implementation of new rules, this flight is beginning
to reverse itself. But, many firms have begun to realize that
insurance is a very poor investment of company funds, and
retaining at least some of the risk is a sound business practice.
There has also been a general lack of flexibility on the
carrier's part. They are often unable to satisfy specialized
needs for services and coverage. These needs encompass requirements,
such as higher retention levels, more closely targeted loss
control services, and greater control of claim settlements.
Company Profile for Workers' Compensation
Captives
In order to seriously consider the formation of a captive,
a company must be financially sound and ready for the commitment
involved. Firms that succeed in the captive world will be
forward thinking with a serious focus on loss control, safety,
and risk management.
They will be willing to share the risks involved in compensation
and have the organizational ability to deal with uncertainty.
Their top managers will be committed to a long-term solution
that will build a financial base to allow for a greater level
of risk acceptance in the future.
The company's losses must be fairly predictable, and the
total expected losses cannot be more than the anticipated
premium. Last, but far from least, in order for the captive
to work as a vehicle for tax savings, the firm must have a
workers' compensation premium in excess of $1,000,000 and
have a need for moving assets off the company's books.
Tax Advantages of Captives
A Captive is formed to allow a firm to place aside the funds
needed to pay present and future claims. Why go to all the
trouble and expense? Why not just open a bank account?
Placing funds aside or obtaining an LOC for current and future
claims payments works well for a firm with low earnings, but
leaving assets on the books can be detrimental to other companies.
Formation of a captive will basically allow a company to
pay premiums to itself. The IRS allows these premiums to be
deducted as expenses. And, while the captive must file a tax
return and recognize income, the IRS allows insurance companies
to deduct for reserves placed aside for claims. The IRS also
allows for reserves to be placed aside for claims that are
"incurred but not reported". These are reserves placed aside
for claims per industry standard that will probably happen,
but you do not know about yet. IBNR reserves are also deducted.
The captive will accrue interest, and, with careful planning,
investment income. But, accounting principles for insurance
companies allow for deducting claims reserves. Therefore,
unlike the bank account, reserves set aside for future claims
payments are deducted immediately. Alternatively, if a firm
sets aside cash to pay claims, it must pay tax on those funds
before paying the claim.
These deductions, along with other normal expenses, will
drive up the amount of cash a firm can place in the captive.
For a large firm, the amount of capital set aside can be substantial.
This is the reason many Fortune 500 firms have entered the
captive market and taken on their own risk.
Benefits of a Captive
The primary benefit of a captive is tax control and is not
just the fact that a company can set aside capital. A firm
with a captive insurance company has taken positive steps
in setting aside funds for inevitable expenses in a tax-reduced
environment.
There is also a greater incentive for management to implement
effective loss control and return to work programs. Coordination
with claims administrators to reduce or eliminate loses becomes
paramount. In this way, senior management will develop a greater
understanding of insurance, risk management, and the risk
financing process.
A captive operates more efficiently for the parent than conventional
insurance and can apply a higher percentage of the premium
dollar to claims. This, along with accrued investment income,
will result in a reduction of the overall cost of insurance.
As an insurance company, the captive has direct access to
the wholesale insurance market. This will not only lower costs,
but it will allow for additional negotiating leverage in dealing
with underwriters.
There are fewer regulatory restrictions for captives than
there are for normal insurers. This is due to the simple fact
that captives are generally not dealing with the public, and
Departments of Insurance in the captive domiciles feel that
a captive will try very hard to "do no harm" to the parent
company.
When a captive formulates coverage for the parent company,
it is generally very favorable. There are some limits, of
course. A firm participating in a rent-a-captive has limited
control over the insurance form, whereas the owner of a pure
captive can cover almost any risk.
Disadvantages of a Captive
When the captive is funded, the company must allocate funds
into an area of operation that is not part of the mainstream
activities. It is entirely possible that these funds will
be needed to cover underwriting losses, albeit on a controlled
basis.
When a company decides to use a captive, there must be a
firm commitment to a long-term goal of lowering costs and
absorbing new administration costs. The captive is in no way
a short-term price fix. Without a senior management commitment,
the firm may face unintended tax consequences as well as unforeseen
legal exposure.
In Conclusion
While captives are not right for every company, the tax advantages
can be substantial. Captive programs can be funded as needed
throughout the year. These funds are considered premium payments
by the IRS and are therefore tax exempt, saving the company
38% to 40% up front.
A reputable Risk Management firm, in conjunction with a good
CPA, should perform a thorough evaluation of your company's
insurance needs and financial situation. Orion Risk Management
has the experience and knowledge to evaluate your position
and advise you on available avenues of coverage that will
suit your particular needs. We work closely with our clients
to form the type of coverage best suited to their specific
situation.
Bill Campbell works in conjunction with the risk management
team of Orion Risk Management, Inc. Orion is a leader in alternative
risk plans that allow their clients the opportunity to more
closely control costs and coverage. http://orionrisk.com
__________
ALTERNATIVE INSURANCE
Litigation Expense Policies and Risk Retention Groups
by Jay Adkisson and Chris Riser
The relationship between asset protection and insurance is
rarely discussed and is generally poorly understood. Some
asset protection planners advise their clients to get rid
of their insurance coverage altogether. The rationale is that
the existence of an insurance policy creates a target for
plaintiffs' attorneys. The money saved by eliminating insurance
coverage can be utilized, of course, to pay the planner's
fees in setting up the expensive asset protection plan that
will render insurance coverage unnecessary.
Of course, this is ridiculous - and dangerous to boot. A
client has little or no financial stake in whether an insurance
company pays a plaintiff's claim other than the possibility
of future premium increases. It also does not recognize that
plaintiffs' attorneys focus closely on reaching settlements
with insurance companies and moving on to the next case, instead
of wasting money, and more importantly, time that could be
applied to getting their next big insurance settlement. Similarly,
the asset protection client's main motivation should be to
get rid of a lawsuit and get back to making money, and not
to spend years dodging creditors.
Insurance then, is an incredibly useful and often relatively
inexpensive asset protection tool. It is specifically designed
to transfer the risk of loss away from the client and to the
insurance company. To the extent that it makes economic sense
to cover a particular risk and insurance is available, insurance
always should be the primary risk management method and asset
protection should play only a secondary role.
Thus, a client should purchase as much insurance coverage
as is economically practical. The client's asset protection
planning should be integrated with that coverage. The goal
is to create a scenario where a plaintiff and his attorney
are very likely to accept the limits of the client's insurance
coverage in settlement of a claim, even if the plaintiff's
potential recovery is greater than the insurance coverage
limits. When insurance coverage is available to meet a plaintiff's
claim, the plaintiff's attention becomes focused on the insurer,
because the insurance company has the proverbial deep pockets.
Where an insurance company is on the hook for at least a portion
of the liability to a creditor, every attempt should be made
to transfer the onus of non-payment to the insurance company
and away from the client. At the very least, every business
should have a general liability insurance policy, and every
household should have umbrella coverage in addition to homeowner's
and auto policies.
Litigation Expense Policies
A litigation expense policy is simply an insurance policy
that pays for the costs of defending a lawsuit. If a defendant's
only insurance is a litigation expense policy and the insured
loses at trial, the litigation expense policy will not pay
the plaintiff or indemnify the insured for its losses. It
only covers litigation expenses.
In the mid-1990s, with the emergence of the modern captive
markets, litigation expense policies resurfaced as a flexible
and sophisticated asset protection tool. These instruments
now play an important role in advanced asset protection planning.
The primary value of a litigation expense policy is that
it pays the legal costs of defending certain claims without
making a pot of money available to a plaintiff who is able
to obtain a judgment. The issuing insurance company - but
not the insured - retains the right to settle the claim within
remaining policy limits, meaning that the longer the litigation
lasts the less money will be available for settlement, all
the way down to nothing. For plaintiffs' attorneys, this is
a tremendous incentive to settle the case early and within
the limits of the LEP policy.
But litigation expense policies can cover more than just
litigation expenses. Litigation expense policies can be negotiated
to cover a broad range of risks, including paying for the
lost work time of the insured in responding to discovery requests
and travel expenses to and from key depositions and trial.
Litigation expense policies may also be used to strengthen
the effectiveness of existing insurance. One way in which
they can do this is by providing counsel in addition to the
attorney provided by the primary liability insurer in order
to ensure that the insured's interests are well covered, and
in order to provide additional assistance in the litigation.
Similarly, litigation expense policies also provide "bad faith"
coverage to challenge the primary insurance company's failure
to defend a claim or to cover a judgment. A comprehensive
litigation expense policy will pay for the cost of hiring
an attorney to write demand letters to the primary insurance
company insisting that they aggressively defend the case,
or settle, if that is in the client's best interests, and
to pay claims to the fullest limits of the policy in the event
of a judgment. The presence of a watchdog may keep the primary
insurance company from abandoning interests of the client,
or at least position the client to bring a bad faith case
against the insurance company should it fail to honor the
terms of its policy.
Another feature of litigation expense policies is the concept
of the "dedicated reserve", which is a segregated reserve
account set aside specifically for the particular policy for
which the premium is paid (after the insurance company's deduction
for its fees). The dedicated reserve ensures that regardless
of what happens to the insurance company, funds will be available
to meet claims.
Litigation expense policies can contain a number of other
useful features, limited only by the imaginations of the parties
negotiating the policy's terms. Because litigation expense
policies of the type described here are sold exclusively by
small offshore insurance companies, their policy provisions
can be quite flexible without the risk of interference from
the local insurance commissioner.
Although a creditor may challenge the payment of premiums
to an insurance company for a litigation expense policy as
a fraudulent transfer, that challenge is unlikely to be effective.
The transfer of the premium is "for value", i.e., the insured
receives valuable policy benefits in exchange for the premiums
paid. Also, if the insurance company is offshore it will be
unlikely to refund the premium depending on the terms and
services already provided, including, presumably, funding
the fraudulent transfer litigation. Thus, litigation expense
policies can be useful tools even for a debtor involved in
a current lawsuit.
Like any other sophisticated products, litigation expense
policies are subject to abuse. In particular, beware of refund
policies which are pitched as an asset protection tool but
are little more than a dubious tax shelter. Marketed primarily
to physicians, these products promise that the insured can
pay a premium to the insurance company, take a business deduction
for it, and then at the end of the policy term recapture the
premium inside a cash-value life insurance product, Roth IRA
or some other tax advantaged investment vehicle, allegedly
allowing the insured to deduct the substantial premium then
to receive the funds back tax-free without recapturing the
income tax deduction. These schemes are clearly questionable
and aggressive tax shelters.
Furthermore, the insurance policies usually do not stand
up to scrutiny as insurance policies. For example, coverage
limits may be identical to premiums paid, or the policy may
require the payment of additional premiums if claims exceed
the initial premiums paid. Many such policies require the
transfer of money offshore, which of course raises serious
concerns about the potential loss of the money to embezzlement
and tax or financial transactions reporting requirements that
could compromise the supposed tax and asset protection benefits.
The IRS is examining some of the more heavily-marketed arrangements
and we would not be surprised to see them soon specifically
designated as illegal tax shelters.
Litigation expense policies are really not designed to be
tax products, although they have occasionally been used that
way. The problem with using them as tax products is that litigation
expense policies are meant to be last-ditch products that
create powerful asset protection weapons in the event a determined
creditor comes along. Litigation expense policies which are
also designed to be tax shelters may compromise the insurance
coverage, for if the IRS says that for tax purposes, the policy
reserves really belong to the policyholder, the creditor might
have an opening to convince a court that the policy reserves
really belong to the policyholder for legal purposes as well.
A truism of asset protection applies here: that which attempts
to accomplish everything often will accomplish nothing.
When considering a litigation expense policy, a U.S. attorney
familiar with onshore and offshore property and casualty policies
in general as well as with litigation expense policies should
always be employed to negotiate the terms of the policy and
to investigate the issuing insurance company and the totality
of the arrangement.
LEPs are ideal policies to be issued by captive insurance
companies.
Risk Retention Groups
A Risk Retention Group
(RRG) is a member-owned business association that is formed
specifically for the purpose of pooling and sharing similar
business risks. RRGs must be licensed in at least one state
or the District of Columbia, but once licensed are allowed
under the federal Liability Risk Retention Act of 1986 (which
specifically preempts contrary state laws) to underwrite the
insurance risks of its members nationwide, including giving
preferential rates, terms and conditions to groups seeking
liability insurance coverage.
The members of an RRG
must be engaged in the same or similar businesses, at least
so far as the liability exposures are concerned. Interestingly,
insurance companies are forbidden from being members of an
RRG unless all the other members are insurance companies.
RRGs are exempt from federal and state securities registration,
but must make full disclosures of all their operations to
their members.
RRGs are effectively
exempt from state law except that the states can still collect
premium and surplus taxes, force compliance with unfair claim
settlement practices, and follow a few other requirements
common to insurance companies. The states may not, however,
dictate rates, coverages, forms, methods of operations or
investment activities, loss control or claims, etc. RRGs can
thus underwrite most types of general liability policies,
such as Errors & Omissions and Products Liability insurance,
etc., but RRGs are not allowed to underwrite insurance relating
to employees, such as workers' compensation, property insurance,
and personal lines insurance such as auto insurance.
A key benefit to the
use of RRGs is that, because each policyholder is also a member
who participates in profits, each policyholder has substantial
incentive to engage in proactive risk management to try to
avoid claims, instead of just "let the insurance company take
care of it." The members also can adopt better loss-control
and more quickly identify other members whose risk-management
is lax, and either assist them in upgrading their risk management
or else invite them to take their insurance business elsewhere.
Indeed, it is the fact that the members of an RRG know their
business better than anybody else that often give the RRG
an underwriting edge over insurance companies.
RRGs are commonly used
in conjunction with its members' captive insurance companies.
The idea is that the RRGs pool a certain layer of risk, and
then each member's captive reinsures the RRG for the remaining
layers. Captives are also used to reinsure the particular
risks of the members who own the captives. This arrangement
is often necessary since the member's captive insurance company
for cost and asset protection reasons is probably domiciled
outside the United States, and is not admitted to underwrite
business in the states where the RRG is operating. When used
in this fashion, the RRG effectively becomes, quite legally,
the fronting company for the members' captives.
For example, assume
that Members A, B, and C form a Risk Retention Group to offer
products liability insurance coverage of up to $1 million
for each of the members. Historically, the losses of each
member have averaged about $50,000 per year. Members A, B,
and C each also have captive insurance companies, and their
captives reinsure the RRG for their own annual claims exceeding
$100,000 per member. Thus, the members have pooled their risks
for their first $100,000 losses each per member, and have
accepted the risks of losses exceeding this amount. Members
B and C now need not worry if Member A has losses of $1 million
in a given year, since their exposure as to Member A's liability
is capped at $100,000 by the reinsurance policy given by Member
A's captive.
While the formation
of a Risk Retention Group is a major undertaking, requiring
licensing by at least one state, it is one of the strongest
risk management tools available for like businesses. It can
also be a very good investment for the original owners to
form the RRG and manage it.
IRS ISSUES NEW REVENUE RULING 2005-40
Finally giving insurance practitioners some long-needed guidance
on what constitutes "insurance", the IRS has released Revenue
Ruling 2005-40 which discusses in some detail what does and
does not constitute risk-sharing and risk-shifting for federal
tax purposes.
In our next issue of Developments, Chris Riser will give
a detailed overview of captive insurance company taxation.
For the moment, however, we are attaching Rev.Ruling 2005-40
to the end of this Developments so that you can read for yourself
what the Service has to say.
______________________
STUPID CAPTIVE TRICKS
by Jay Adkisson
There are a lot of people who try to put together their own
captive and mess it up pretty badly which exposes themselves
and their businesses to both tax liability and sometimes even
criminal penalties. Sadly, there are also many advisors out
there who try to form captives but don't really understand
what they are doing and end up botching it pretty badly. This
article reviews some of the bad practices that we see when
people bring us their captives to review.
Didn't Get the News About 501(c)(15)?
For whatever reasons, there still seem to be a few people
who have not yet received the news the 501(c)(15) captive
is effectively no more. While Congress did not abolish 501(c)(15)
insurance companies outright, Congress instead created a $600,000
maximum limit for gross receipts of both the insurance company
and other companies held by the same control
group.
In other words, if the both the insurance company's income
and the income of the owners exceeds $600,000 in a given year,
then the 501(c)(15) limit has been busted and that exception
can no longer apply. Since probably no business that would
even consider a captive would have less than $600,000
in income by itself, the effect of Congress' change - which
became effective as of December 31 of 2003 - is to have eliminated
the provisions for anybody who actually needs it.
Some tax professionals apparently did not get the news about
this change, and have been blissfully advising their clients
that 501(c)(15) is alive and well, although their clients
are about to wake up to a horrible tax nightmare. Worse, some
of these professionals have misconstrued the Determination
Letter given to them by the IRS to allow in some way an "exception"
to the gross receipts test, which is absolutely not the case.
To the contrary, such letters only say that the captive is
exempt only so long as it complies with 501(c)(15), which
is no longer practically feasible. Malpractice per se.
The Single-Insured Captive
Another common error is the person who sets up an insurance
company but then only uses it to underwrite the risks of his
own company. Since there is no risk-spreading or risk-shifting,
there is little chance that the IRS will consider the insurance
company's activities to be that of insurance, and thus little
chance that the IRS will consider the insurance company to
be an insurance company for tax purposes - even if it holds
a nice, shiny license from somewhere.
Where people run adrift of this mud bar is where they have
received bad advice from their Property-Casualty broker, and
set up a captive to underwrite their business needs, thinking
that because they have 11 or more single-member LLCs as subsidiaries,
they meet the test for risk-sharing and risk-shifting. To
the contrary, as the IRS recently announced in Rev.Ruling
2005-40 (which is appended to this newsletter), the IRS simply
disregards the single-member LLCs and thus there is just one
policyholder - and no risk-sharing or risk-shifting.
There is one major Property-Casualty insurance broker who
has (crazily) been advising its clients to set up these arrangements,
and we would not be surprised to see significant litigation
against this broker and some of its accommodating advisors
who only thought that they understood the federal tax treatment
of insurance companies.
The Sham Segregated-Cell Captive
This is a strategy being sold to doctors, whereby they act
like they are making payments of medical malpractice premiums
or disability income premiums to an offshore segregated-cell
insurance company, but the insurance company after some period
of time ends up paying out those premiums as "profits" to
an offshore trust or similar arrangement that is controlled
(directly or indirectly) by the physician. Sometimes these
arrangements are designed so that they appear as offshore
deferred compensation arrangements.
At any rate, what happens is about the same in all these
schemes: The physician makes his premium payment to the segregated-cell
captive, takes a deduction for it, and then gets his money
back tax-free offshore.
There are four words which are applicable to this structure:
Don't drop the soap. This is amazingly blatant criminal tax
evasion, and the physician who doesn't fess up before being
caught by the IRS will get to spend some quality time at Club
Fed. This will be in addition to the huge fines and penalties
that the physician will get to pay, in addition to the back
taxes and interest.
One of these programs is being marketed by a law firm in
the Bahamas, which has aggressively approached property-casualty
brokers in the U.S. and even some financial planners to help
them sell this scheme. Don't believe it. The Bahamas law
firm claims that they have opinion letters and other stuff
that will keep the physician out of jail when the time comes,
but this scheme is so detached from tax reality that the physician
caught up in it will not have a prayer when the IRS criminal
investigation agents come knocking.
Offshore planning in general is a flame to which physician
moths flock to and get burned. This segregated cell scheme
is just another in a long line of abusive offshore strategies
that will keep many physicians awake at night wondering whether
they will be indicted, just as the abusive Irish or Barbados
employee leasing schemes are doing to hundreds of physicians
nationwide now.
The Lesson
Captive insurance company taxation is complex and changing.
It is very easy to screw up and hit one of the many deadly
tax landmines, leading to the entire captive arrangement being
disregarded. While captive insurance is a very powerful tool,
it must be accompanied by quality tax advice and counsel.
If an arrangement sounds too easy or too good to be true,
seek a second independent opinion from a qualified tax professional
who has experience with insurance company taxation.
__________
RECENT CASE UPDATE
Christopher v. Gonzalez, 2005 Cal. App. Unpub.
LEXIS 4569 (May 25, 2005)
The California Court of Appeals held proof of the existence
of one or more factors used to test "actual intent to hinder,
delay, or defraud" a creditor for the purposes of a claim
pursuant to the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act do not create
a presumption that the debtor has made a fraudulent transfer.
The court affirmed the trial court's decision to grant summary
judgment in favor of the defendant debtor, even though the
trial court erroneously concluded that actual intent is required
to bring a cause of action for fraudulent transfer.
Erik Christopher sued Omar Gonzalez and his company, Omar's
Exotic Birds, Inc., pursuant to the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer
Act. Christopher was a judgment creditor of one of Gonzalez's
other companies, Neon. Christopher alleged that Gonzalez
fraudulently transferred Neon's assets to himself and Omar's.
At trial, Gonzalez testified that the transfers were made
in satisfaction of debts of Neon owed to Gonzalez and Omar's.
The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Gonzalez
and Omar's, and Christopher appealed.
The appellate court affirmed the trial court's decision,
ruling that, even if the evidence shows factors such as insolvency
of the debtor after the transfer or failure to receive reasonably
equivalent value for the transfer, such factors are not presumptive
of fraudulent intent. The court found that there was sufficient
evidence that Gonzalez made the transfers in satisfaction
of debts owed by Neon to Gonzalez and to Omar.
* * *
Filip v. Bucurenciu, 2005 Cal. App. LEXIS 841
(May 24, 2005)
The California Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's
decision, ruling that property transactions associated with
a marital dissolution and property settlement agreement may
be subject to the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act. The court
affirmed a finding of fraudulent transfer and conspiracy to
commit fraudulent transfer.
Marin Filip obtained a judgment against Petru Bucurenciu
for $366,388.77. Subsequently, Petru and his wife, Marioara
Bucurenciu, filed for divorce. The Bucurencius owned four
parcels of real property in the Bucurenciu Family Trust.
After the settlement agreement, Marioara formed Loomis Land,
Inc. (LLI), in which she and her daughter, Roxanne, were sole
shareholders. Pursuant to a settlement agreement between
Petru and Marioara, one of the properties was transferred
to LLI, as Marioara's property. Even though a second property
was allocated to Petru in the settlement agreement, this property
was also transferred to LLI. A third property was transferred
to Titus and Slyvia Bujdei in exchange for a $400,000 promissory
note.
Filip brought suit against the Bucurencius, the Bujdeis,
LLI, and the Bucurenciu Family Trust, alleging violation of
the UFTA. The trial court entered judgment in favor of Filip,
holding that the Bucurencius and the Bujdeis engaged in conspiracy
to defraud Filip as defined under the UFTA. The court held
the transfers and sales of the properties were fraudulent
and set aside the transfers. The court allowed the properties
to be seized or foreclosed in order to satisfy Filip's judgment
against the defendants. Further, the court held that the
property settlement pursuant to the Bucurencius' divorce decree
did not protect Marioara from Filip's fraudulent transfer
claim.
The appellate court agreed with the trial court, ruling that
the evidence was substantial enough to satisfy the UFTA's
requirement that a transfer was made with "actual intent to
hinder, delay, or defraud any creditor of the debtor." The
court noted that intent is proved by factors that indicate
"badges of fraud," such as retaining control after the property
is transferred, insider transfers, whether the debtor has
been sued prior to the transfer, and whether the value received
by the debtor was reasonably equivalent to the value of the
transferred asset.
The court observed that the sale of one parcel of property
to the Bujdeis indicated fraudulent intent to hinder Filip
because it was sold for less than fair market value. The
property was appraised at $530,000, and the Bucurencius sold
it to the Bujdeis for no money down and a $400,000 promissory
note. Further, the court stated that the trial court properly
concluded based on the evidence, that the other transfers
to LLI were fraudulent. Thus, the court used the finding
of fraudulent transfer as the underlying tort for civil conspiracy.
* * *
Baillie Lumber Company v. Thompson, 2005 Ga.
Lexis 300 (April 26, 2005).
The Supreme Court of Georgia held a debtor corporation may
bring an alter ego claim against the corporation's former
principal, even if the corporation is protected under a Chapter
11 bankruptcy stay.
Bert Thompson was the manager and sole shareholder of Piedmont
Hardwood Flooring, Inc, when he misappropriated Piedmont's
assets for his own use and relinquished his control of the
company. Baillie Lumber is an unsecured creditor of Piedmont.
After Thompson relinquished his control, Piedmont filed for
bankruptcy under Chapter 11 and was allowed to operate as
a debtor in possession. Icarus Holding LLC was formed to
wind up and to be held as a suable entity for Piedmont.
This opinion is in response to two certified questions from
the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals to the Supreme Court
of Georgia. The questions are: (1) Under Georgia law, may
the representative of a debtor corporation bring an alter
ego claim against the corporation's formal principal? (2)
If so, what is the measure of recovery?
The procedural history is as follows. Icarus filed a complaint
in bankruptcy court to recover assets that it alleged Thompson
fraudulently transferred and misappropriated. Subsequently,
Baillie filed suit in state court against Thompson, alleging
that Thompson was the alter ego of Icarus and seeking to pierce
the corporate veil and hold Thompson personally liable for
the debts of Icarus.
Thompson moved for injunctive relief in the bankruptcy court,
seeking to stop Icarus' state law suit on the basis that the
alter ego claim against Thompson is property of the bankruptcy
estate, and only Icarus has standing to bring the suit. The
bankruptcy court ruled that any alter ego claim against the
principal of the corporation is property of the bankruptcy
estate and subject to the automatic stay. The court explained
that allowing an unsecured creditor to make an alter ego claim
against the principal of the debtor corporation circumvents
the bankruptcy law by depriving other unsecured creditors
of their pro rata share of recovery. The district court adopted
the bankruptcy court's opinion, and Baillie appealed to the
circuit court.
In answering the circuit court's certified questions, the
highest state court answered in the affirmative to the question
of whether a corporation may bring suit against its former
principal on an alter ego claim. As to the second question,
the court answered that the corporation may seek the remedies
of disregarding the corporate entity and holding the former
principal liable for the corporation's debt. The court reasoned
that an alter ego or "piercing the corporate veil" claim has
the purpose of remedying abuse of the corporate form, and
confining the doctrine to third-parties thwarts the equitable
principles behind piercing the corporate veil. In other words,
the court stated that the relationship between the corporation
and the party who is suing the corporation is not as important
as the equitable principles behind the veil piercing doctrine.
Further, the court noted that it is unlikely a corporation,
outside of a bankruptcy context, would institute an alter
ego action, and the veil piercing doctrine is only allowed
when there is a lack of adequate remedies.
! ! ! ! !
In
re Robin Bruce McNabb, 326 B.R. 785 (Bankr. D. Ariz 06/23/2005).
In one of the first cases to interpret the new Bankruptcy
Act, discussed in our May 2005 edition of Developments, a
federal bankruptcy judge in Arizona has held to the effect
that federal limitations on homestead exemption, where the
homestead had not yet been owned for 40 months, were not applicable
where Arizona had "opted-out" of federal exemptions. Instead,
Arizona's homestead cap would apply, and not the federal cap.
Creditors argued that because McNabb had not lived in his
Arizona home for 40 months, the California homestead exemption
would apply. Because the California exemption was much lower
than the $150,000 exemption provided under Arizona law, McNabb
argued that Arizona law would apply since Arizona had opted-out
of the federal bankruptcy exemptions.
In allowing McNabb to assert the Arizona protections, the
court went out of its way to criticize this aspect of the
new Bankruptcy Act:
". it makes little sense to limit the cap to the
few remaining non-opt out states . . . Until Congress does
fix it, however, the Court must apply the unambiguous statute
as written . . . The cap applies only 'as a result of electing'.
Where there is no election, the cap cannot be the result."
The court then ordered an evidentiary hearing to determine
other issues in the case, presumably including whether McNabb's
transfer of residency from California to Arizona was meant
to "hinder, delay or defraud" creditors, meaning that many
more statutory cans of worms remain for the court to open
in attempting to interpret the new Act.
The vague rumors floating around include those that Congress
may attempt to pass certain technical amendments this Fall
to clear up certain issues as have arisen in McNabb. Whether
or not that happens, this case shows that the new Bankruptcy
Act has already started to generate intense surprises for
debtors and creditors alike, and this will of course continue
at least until we have a few circuit-level cases interpreting
the Act.
Keep your seatbelt fastened, tight.
_____________________
REPORT FROM QUATLOOSIA
By Tony-the-Wonder-Llama
Seems like people will figure out how to make a buck out
of anything. Lately, this includes death. Don't get me wrong:
Since the dawn of man a lot of people have been making a lot
of money on death. Death sells, for the reason that it is
the big unavoidable. Morticians and those who sell burial
plots are getting ready to go through their biggest up cycle
ever as the baby boomers start cashing it in. And life insurance
has always been a very lucrative business, though the trouble
with life insurance is that you actually have to die to reap
the benefit of it.
Not anymore. Seems like some very bright people have figured
out a way for you to make money on your life insurance before
you die. No, it does not involve being placed into a time
machine and being teleported to some future date right after
you've been lowered into the ground where you collect on your
own policy and then get zapped back to the present where you
can spend it. It doesn't involve you faking your death, either.
Nope, these very bright people have figured out a way for
you to make money on your own death before you die, in a way
that doesn't involve fraud or teleporting. To the contrary,
they will show you how to create vast amounts of cash - hundreds
of thousands of dollars if not more - seemingly out of thin
air without you having to do much than take a medical, signs
some forms, receive the check, and then of course at some
future date die at your leisure.
The one sure thing about anything this good is that it is
sure to get a bunch of other folks all riled up, and indeed
this strategy has of late come under some serious scrutiny
with some other very bright people claiming that there are
some significant and hidden downsides to the strategy. What?
You can't get something for nothing? If it is too good then
it is not true?
Somewhere between the very bright people who claim that you
can make money off your death before you die, and the very
bright people who claim that you can't, lies the truth. To
find that truth you must first understand the concept of a
"life settlement", and to understand that, you must understand
what its immediate predecessor, the "viatical settlement"
are all about.
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