California

Warning: The following opinion is provided for purposes of discussion only. We have not Shepardized™ this opinion, and do not know the subsequent disposition of this case nor whether the effect of the opinion has been overruled or superceded by other law.

TRUDY K. BUTCHER, as Administrator, etc., Plaintiff and Respondent,
v. MARCEIL F. FORD, Defendant and Appellant.

E029806

COURT OF APPEAL OF CALIFORNIA, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT,
DIVISION TWO

February 27, 2002, Filed

NOTICE: [*1] NOT TO BE PUBLISHED CALIFORNIA RULES OF COURT, RULE 977(a), PROHIBITS COURTS AND PARTIES FROM CITING OR RELYING ON OPINIONS NOT CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION OR ORDERED PUBLISHED, EXCEPT AS SPECIFIED BY RULE 977(B). THIS OPINION HAS NOT BEEN CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION OR ORDERED PUBLISHED FOR PURPOSES OF RULE 977.

PRIOR HISTORY: APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Super.Ct.No. SCV196692. Christopher J. Warner, Judge.

DISPOSITION: Affirmed.

COUNSEL: Law Offices of J. Patrick Ragan and J. Patrick Ragan for Defendant and Appellant.

Martin E. Keller for Plaintiff and Respondent.

JUDGES: Ward, J. We concur: Ramirez, P.J. Richli, J.

OPINIONBY: Ward

OPINION: Plaintiff, cross-defendant and appellant Marceil F. Ford (Ford) appeals two orders rendered after judgment. Ford argues that the trial court erred in determining that a resulting trust was imposed on real property owned by Ford. We affirm the trial court's orders.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Ford and Phillip L. Davis (decedent) lived together for a substantial period of time. They were not married. After their separation, Ford filed suit against decedent to determine the rights of the respective parties as [*2] to property acquired during their relationship, which included a property located at 342 East 38th Street in San Bernardino, California (the property). After decedent died, his daughter, Trudy Butcher, was appointed administrator of his estate. Butcher filed a cross-complaint against Ford. Neither the complaint nor the cross-complaint were included in the record on appeal. This litigation will be referred to as the underlying action.

On September 25, 1986, the court issued its notice of intended decision on the underlying action. With regard to the property, the court stated as follows:

"As pointed out, this Court granted [Ford's] C.C.P. 631.8 motion as to [Butcher's] Eighth Cause of Action because the evidence was insufficient to show an agreement between the parties that [Ford] would give Decedent a one-half interest in her separate property. However, the motion was denied as to the Sixth Cause of Action alleging a pooling agreement and the advance of $ 125.00 per month for the house payment from 1968 (when Decedent started working for We Care) to May 1980. The Court agrees that [Butcher] is entitled to be reimbursed to the extent of one-half of the amounts [*3] advanced, namely, $ 9,312.50, and that a resulting trust exists in favor of [Butcher]."

After a trial on the complaint and cross-complaint, on February 11, 1987, the court entered judgment in favor of Butcher, as executor of the decedent's estate, "as against Marceil F. Ford, severally, as follows:

"(1) In the principal amount of $ 12,114.71."

Moreover, consistent with the notice of intended decision, the trial court also awarded a resulting trust on the property: "A resulting trust in the amount of $ 9,312.50 is imposed on that real property located at 342 E. 38th Street, San Bernardino, California

. . . ." Ford did not appeal this judgment.

After the issuance of the notice of intended decision, but before the filing of the final judgment, Ford recorded a Homestead Declaration on the property.

Fourteen years later, Ford wanted to sell the property. Hence, Ford filed an application for order confirming her homestead exemption on the property. In essence, Ford asked the court to confirm her homestead exemption of $ 125,000 in the property and to declare that the property could be sold "free and clear of [Butcher's] Judgment Lien."

Butcher opposed the application. [*4] Butcher argued that the homestead exemption did not apply to the portion of the judgment imposing a resulting trust in the amount of $ 9,312.50 on the property.

While the application was pending, the parties stipulated that the property may be sold and clear of the judgment, provided that $ 25,000 from the proceeds of the sale be held in trust by Butcher's counsel, pending the court's order on Ford's application.

After further briefing and oral argument on Ford's application, the trial court ordered as follows: (1) that the homestead declaration exempted the proceeds arising from the sale of the property as to the portion of the 1987 judgment award $ 12,114.71 to Butcher; and (2) that the homestead declaration did not exempt the proceeds arising from the sale of the property as to the portion of the 1987 judgment establishing a resulting trust in the amount of $ 9,312.50 on the property.

In the order, the court also ordered that Butcher "is entitled to appreciation based upon a fractional share relative to the [decedent's] contributions compared with the worth of the property as of the date of the entry of judgment establishing the resulting trust.

Thereafter, [*5] the parties stipulated to an order that "the appreciation of the value of the real property, and of the fractional share reflected by the amount of the resulting trust, from February 11, 1987 to the present shall be deemed to be equal to ten percent (10 %) per annum."

Ford appeals both orders.

ANALYSIS

I. The Trial Court's Orders Are Proper

"The sole issue on appeal is the character of the 'resulting trust' of $ 9,312.50 and whether or not it constitutes an interest impressed on the [property], or whether that amount is merely money damages enforceable personally as to [Ford]. . . ." We hold that, based on the notice of intended decision and the judgment, the trial court imposed a resulting trust, in the amount of $ 9,312.50, on the property.

A. Standard of Review

Ford argues that the appropriate standard of review is substantial evidence. Ford, therefore, argues that because there is substantial evidence to support her interpretation of the judgment in the underlying action, this case should be reversed. Ford is mistaken.

First, the appropriate standard of review for this case is de novo because matters presenting pure questions of law, not involving [*6] resolution of disputed facts, are subject to the reviewing court's independent or de novo review. n1 Here, we need not resolve a disputed fact. Instead, we are simply called upon to interpret the judgment rendered by the trial court in the underlying action.

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n1 Ghirardo v. Antonioli (1994) 8 Cal.4th 791, 799, 883 P.2d 960.

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Second, even if we were to adopt Ford's substantial evidence standard of review, the result would be an affirmance of the trial court's orders because there is substantial evidence to support the orders. "When a trial court's factual determination is attacked on the ground that there is no substantial evidence to sustain it, the power of an appellate court begins and ends with the determination as to whether, on the entire record, there is substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, which will support the determination . . . ." n2 In applying the substantial evidence test, this court resolves all issues of credibility and conflicts [*7] in the evidence in favor of the judgment. n3

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n2 Bowers v. Bernards (1984) 150 Cal. App. 3d 870, 873-874, 197 Cal. Rptr. 925, original italics.

n3 Nestle v. City of Santa Monica (1972) 6 Cal.3d 920, 925, 101 Cal. Rptr. 568, 496 P.2d 480.

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B. The Trial Court Imposed a Resulting Trust on the Property

The judgment unequivocally imposed a resulting trust on the property: It stated that Butcher, as executor of the decedent's estate, shall have judgment against Ford as follows: "A resulting trust in the amount of $ 9,312.50 is imposed on that real property

. . . ." (Italics added.)

The imposition of a resulting trust on the property is consistent with the trial court's statement in its notice of intended decision. In the notice, the trial court stated that the evidence was insufficient to show that decedent would be entitled to a one-half interest in the property -- which was Ford's separate property. The court, however, went on to [*8] state that there was a "pooling agreement" between the parties wherein decedent advanced $ 125 per month for the house payments from 1968 to 1980, which totaled $ 9,312.50. As to this amount, which was for payments on the property, the court imposed a resulting trust. "When one person furnishes the money or other thing of value with which property is acquired and title to the property is taken in the name of another, absent the intention of the one to confer a gift upon the other, the titleholder is a trustee upon a resulting trust of the property for the benefit of the person who furnished the money or other thing of value by which the property was acquired. If only a portion of the acquisition has been furnished, a resulting trust may be established in a fractional interest in the property on a pro tanto basis." n4

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n4 In re Marriage of Mastropaolo (1985) 166 Cal. App. 3d 953, 964, 213 Cal. Rptr. 26.

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Even Ford admits that "there is no question that the Trial Judge (Hon. [*9] James Edwards) determined the existence of a Resulting Trust [in the underlying action]; and [Ford] does not challenge that determination here on appeal [citation]." Nonetheless, Ford claims that there was a finding by the trial court in the underlying action that the property remained the separate property of Ford, and decedent "acquire no interest therein despite advancements of the monthly mortgage payment." Ford's contention is inaccurate and misleading. The trial court never made such a ruling. The trial court stated that there was insufficient interest to award decedent a one-half interest in the property. The court, however, went on to state that decedent acquired an interest in the property in proportion to the monthly advancements it made on the property from 1968 to 1980. Thereafter, entered judgment in favor of Butcher, and against Ford by imposing a resulting trust on the property.

Moreover, Ford argues that Butcher's treatment of the $ 9,312.50 judgment as "a personal money judgment," and not as a "special lien" on the property supports her argument. Not so. When Butcher renewed the judgment, she checked the box next to the category of "renewal [*10] of money judgment," which included $ 9,312.50 "as a resulting trust." This document simply shows that Butcher sought to have her judgment renewed, including the judgment for a resulting trust in the amount of $ 9,312.50. This document does not affect the interpretation of the court's judgment and notice of intended decision. As stated above, those two documents clearly provide that a resulting trust on the property was imposed by the court.

Furthermore, Ford's reliance on Elliott v. Elliott n5 (Elliott) and Penziner v. West American Finance Co. n6 (Penziner) is inappropriate because the two cases are inapplicable.

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n5 Elliott v. Elliott (1964) 231 Cal. App. 2d 205, 41 Cal. Rptr. 686.

n6 Penziner v. West American Finance Co. (1933) 133 Cal.App. 578, 24 P.2d 501.

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In Elliott and Penziner, the court reaffirmed the principle that if a party is entitled to a resulting or constructive trust in certain property, but [*11] that property has been destroyed or placed beyond the reach of the trust beneficiary, the beneficiary is still entitled to a money judgment. n7 We agree with this legal proposition. We, however, fail to see the relevance of these cases to this case.

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n7 Elliott v. Elliott, supra, 231 Cal. App. 2d 205, 209-210, 211; Penziner v. West American Finance Co., supra, 133 Cal.App. 578, 586.

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Here, when Ford first filed her application for an order confirming her homestead exemption on the property, the property had not been destroyed or placed beyond the reach of Butcher. Although the property has now been sold, it was only done so with the parties' stipulation that the property may be sold and clear of the judgment, provided that $ 25,000 from the proceeds of the sale be held in trust by Butcher's counsel, pending the court's order on Ford's application. Hence, unlike the cases relied upon by Ford, there is no need to convert Butcher's resulting trust [*12] into money damages because there is a $ 25,000 trust account upon which to enforce the trust.

In sum, based on the clear language in the judgment and explanation in the notice of intended decision, the court imposed a resulting trust on the property. Ford could have challenged this finding when the judgment was rendered in 1987, 15 years ago. It is too late for Ford to argue that the trial court erred in its finding of a resulting trust at this juncture.

C. The Homestead Exemption Does Not Apply

Ford argues that because "the $ 9,312.50 represents a personal judgment . . .,and not an interest in the property," she is entitled the homestead exemption of $ 125,000 under Code of Civil Procedure, section 704.730, subdivision (a)(3)(A).

Because we have determined that the $ 9,312.50 was not a personal judgment, but that it represented a resulting trust on the property, this argument need not be addressed.

DISPOSITION

The post-judgment orders of the trial court are affirmed.
Ward, J.

We concur:

Ramirez, P.J.

Richli, J.

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